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Abstract 
The objective of this work is to select an optimum Non-Destructive Inspection (NDI) 
technique and its associated inspection interval for welded components subjected to cyclic 
loading. 
The objective function (total cost) is formulated as a function of the decision variables 
(controllable) and condition of the inspected asset (uncontrollable). Total cost consists of 
inspections cost and repairs cost over the lifetime and risk of failure as a result of the 
failure to detect a growing crack before it reaches a critical size. The decision variables are 
the reliability of the NDI technique and the inspection interval. Two main parameters are 
used to quantify the reliability of the NDI techniques. These are the Probability of 
Detection function (POD) and the Probability of False Calls, (PFC). Condition of the 
inspected asset is represented by the probability of the presence of a crack in the inspected 
asset at inspection time and the expected time to failure. The objective function is 
minimized for different NDI techniques subject to a safety constraint: that the probability 
of failure as a result of failure to detect a growing crack before it reaches the critical ize 
does not exceed a predefined limit. The minimum values of the objective functions for all 
candidate NDI techniques are compared to determine the optimal NDI technique and its 
associated inspection interval. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
I nspections during the lifetime of a structure or a piece of equipment are carried out to 
make sure that the structure or the equipment is running according to the design 
specifications and to guarantee a specified acceptable level of safety throughout the 
lifetime of the asset. 
Even with the highest quality of materials and workmanship, the occurrence of some form 
of discontinuity or flaw during manufacture is inevitable. Flaws can be categorized into 
pre-service and in-service flaws depending on whether they originated during 
manufacture or in-service. The manufacturing quality can be achieved using well 
established engineering practices. In-service, the material is subjected to degradation 
1 
caused by different mechanisms which may result in crack initiation and propagation. 
Hence, in-service inspection is required at regular intervals. Inspection results can be used 
in performing maintenance tasks to mitigate risk of failure. These inspections are usually 
carried out using one of the well e tablished Non Destructive Inspection (NDI) 
techniques. 
Fatigue cracks are very common m welded components. Despite the best care taken 
during design, fabrication and inspection, many of the welded components fail as a result 
of fatigue cracks initiated at the welding zone, especially at welding flaws. These flaws 
include but not limited to the existence of cavities, porosities, slag inclusions and poor 
fusion. 
1.1 Objective 
An optimal inspection plan provides inspections at the right location, at the right time 
using the right tool and at the lowest cost without compromising the required safety level. 
The objective of this thesis is to select an optimum Non-Destructive Inspection (NDI) 
technique and its associated inspection interval for in-service inspection of welded 
components. 
1.2 Literature Review 
The available literatures which are focusing on optimization of the inspection planning 
are mainly looking for answering three questions: 
1- Which equipment or component in equipment or structure is more critical and need to 
be inspected more frequently (i.e prioritization of component inspections). 
2 
2- When the inspection should be scheduled (i.e, selection the optimum inspection 
interval). 
3- What inspection method or technique should be used (i.e. selecting an optimum 
inspection technique). 
A number of papers in the literature discuss the problem of prioritization of component 
inspections and selecting an optimum inspection interval but few address the problem of 
selecting an optimum inspection technique. 
Review of Component Inspections Prioritization I Selecting an Optimum Inspection 
Interval 
In 1991, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) developed a risk based 
inspection. ASME risk based inspection approach consisted of four steps: definition of 
the system, a qualitative risk assessment, a quantitative risk assessment, and development 
of inspection program 
In May 1993, the American Petroleum Institute (API) initiated a risk based inspection 
(RBI) project aimed at building an RBI methodology that uses risk as a base for 
prioritizing and managing inspection programs. The API RBI approach is carried out 
based on two levels of analysis: qualitative analysis and semi-quantitative analysis. The 
qualitative approach uses engineering experience and judgment as the bases for the risk 
analysis. Therefore, the accuracy of the results in the qualitative RBI approach depends 
totally on the analyst's experience and background. The semi-quantitative approach 
combines the speed of the qualitative approach and the accuracy of the quantitative 
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approach. The data required for the semi-quantitative approaches are mostly like the ones 
required for quantitative approaches with less details. The API approach ranks the 
equipments or the components through a 5x5 matrix of likelihood and consequence. The 
ranking gives classification of the equipments or the component based on level of the ri k 
(e.g. high, medium, low). The developed RBI methodology was published in 2000 as API 
581. 
Veswly, Belhadje, and Renzoes (1994) presented a probabilistic risk assessment for 
maintenance prioritization applications based on risk level. 
Nessim and Stephens (1995) presented a risk based methodology for selecting the 
optimum maintenance (i.e. repair and inspection) interval for hydrocarbon pipelines 
segments. 
Vaurio (1995) presented a general procedure to optimize inspection and maintenance 
intervals of safety related systems and components. Optimization was done based on 
minimizing the cost under the condition that risk remains below a set criterion. 
Balkey, Art and Bo nk ( 1998) developed a risk based ranking methodology that includes 
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) method. The developed methodology integrate 
nondestructive examination data, failure data, structural reliability and probabilistic risk 
assessment. 
Hagemeijer and Kerkveld ( 1998) developed a risk based methodology which aims at 
optimizing the inspection and maintenance based on minimizing the risk. 
4 
Hamly (1998) developed a risk ranked inspection recommendation procedure to prioritize 
repairs identified during equipment inspection. 
A pel and and A ven (2000) developed a risk based maintenance optimization approach. 
The optimal trategies can be determined by evaluating the relationship between the 
benefits associated with each maintenance alternative and its cost. 
Nessim, Stephens, and Zimmerman (2000) presented a quantitative risk based integrity 
model for maintenance planning for offshore pipelines. Benefits associated with different 
maintenance alternatives are quantified by calculating their impact on the risk of failure. 
Dey (200 1) presented a methodology to identify the right pipeline for inspection and 
maintenance policy; reduces the cost of inspecting and maintaining petroleum pipelines; 
reduces the time spent on inspection; and suggests efficient de ign and operation 
philosophies, construction methodology and logical insurance plans. 
Kallen (2002) developed a probabilistic risk based inspection methodology to develop 
optimal safety inspection plans. Cost functions associated with the deterioration due to 
corrosion are developed. The corrosion deterioration was modeled using gamma 
stochastic deterioration process. 
Chung et al (2003) proposed a reliability-based optimal inspection scheduling. The 
objective function includes the total expected cost of inspection, repair, and failure 
formulated on the basis of an event tree framework and appropriate constraints in 
inspection intervals and minimum (target) structural reliability. The proposed reliability-
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based optimal inspection scheduling gives an optimal inspection-scheduling plan for a 
specified fatigue details (fracture-critical details). 
Khan and Haddara (2003) presented a risk based maintenance methodology for designing 
an optimum inspection and maintenance programs for heating, ventilation and air-
conditioning (HA V AC) systems. 
Fujiyama et al (2004) developed a risk based maintenance (RBM) system for determining 
optimum maintenance and inspection plan for steam turbine plants. The developed risk 
based maintenance system makes use of the field failure and inspection database 
accumulated over 30 years. 
Kallen and Noortwijk (2004) developed a risk inspection technique used in optimal 
inspection and replacement decisions for multiple failure modes. The deterioration model 
is presented along with the cost functions. The cost functions were extended to include 
multiple failure modes. 
Khan and Haddara (2004a) proposed a risk based maintenance (RBM) methodology to 
answer two questions: the maintenance program should be scheduled for which 
equipment? and when the maintenance should be scheduled? 
Khan and Haddara (2004b) developed a comprehensive and quantitative methodology for 
maintenance planning based on risk. This methodology is developed to obtain an 
optimum maintenance schedule that minimizes the probability of failure and its 
consequences. 
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Kallen and Noortwijk (2005) presented a risk based inspection technique (RBI) technique 
that develops cost and safety optimal inspection plan. A periodic inspection and 
replacement policy, which minimizes the expected average costs per year, is found. 
Krishnasamy, Khan and Haddara (2005) developed maintenance trategy based on risk 
for a power generating plant. Applying this risk based maintenance methodology results 
in risk reduction , increases the reliability and reduces the cost of maintenance. 
Noori and Price (2005) implemented the semi-quantitative risk based inspection approach 
developed by the American Petroleum Institute (API) on furnace tubes. The calculated 
5x5 risk matrix is used in determining the highest risk category for the tubes to take the 
priority in planning the inspection program. 
Straub and Faber (2005) presented a new risk based inspection approach. The presented 
approach is an integral approach that considers entire systems in inspection planning, 
while most of the risk based inspection approaches focus exclusively on individual 
components or have considered system effects in a very simplified manner only. 
Khan, Haddara, and Battacharya (2006) developed a risk based methodology for integrity 
and inspection modeling (RBIIM). The methodology presents quantitative risk ba ed 
inspection approaches that use the gamma stochastic process to model the corrosion 
damage mechanism and Bayes's theorem to update knowledge over the corrosion rate. 
The proposed methodology gives a periodic inspection and replacement policy that 
minimizes the expected average cost per year. 
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Review of Selecting an Optimum Inspection Technique I an optimum technique and 
its associated inspection interval 
Chung, et a!. (2006) suggested a model for developing an optimal selection of a NDI 
technique and its associated inspection interval. They formulated a total cost function that 
includes the cost of inspections over the lifetime and the co t of failure but does not 
include the cost of repairs. Probability of failure was defined as the probability of failure 
to detect a growing crack before reaching the critical size. The selection of an optimal 
NDI technique and its associated inspection interval was based on the minimum total cost 
and keeping the probability of fai lure below a predefined limit (safety constraint). 
Schueller and Kuntiyawichai (2006) proposed a reliability based optimization approach 
for NDI planning. The total cost ftmction includes the cost of inspections, the co t of 
repairs over the lifetime and the cost of failure. Probability of failure was defined as the 
probability of a crack reaching the critical size. This probability of failure wa obtained as 
a function of the structural design variables (e.g., thickness), the operation period, and the 
mean and standard deviation of the initial crack size distribution. The NDI technique 
which has a minimum total cost under the condition that the probability failure does not 
exceed a predefined limit was designated the optimal technique .. 
Rouhan and Schoefs (2003) developed a model for selecting an optimum NDI technique. 
The cost function was formulated for only one inspection and divided into two parts. The 
first part includes the cost in case of non-detection (cost of failure and cost of inspection) 
and the other part includes the cost in case of false detection of a crack that does not exist 
(cost of false repair). Probability of detection (POD) for each inspection technique was 
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taken as a constant and not as a function of the crack size. Probability of failure was 
defined as probability of the existence of a crack, having any size, given that the 
inspection technique does not detect this crack. The optimal technique was obtained by 
selecting a technique which gives the minimum cost in the two case of non-detection and 
false detection. 
1.3 Methodology 
The optimization problem IS considered as a decision making problem. The decision 
variables are: 
1. Type of the NDI technique (e.g. Ultrasonic Inspection, Radiographic Inspection) 
which can be quantitatively represented by reliability of the inspection technique 
(Probability of Detection "POD" and Probability of False Calls "PFC"). 
11. The inspection interval. 
The constraint of the optimization problem is probability of failure to be kept less than a 
predefined limit (safety constraint). 
We aim at obtaining a quantitative methodology for solving this optimization problem or 
in other word finding the optimum decision variables which minimize the total cost 
(objective function). The formulated objective function includes cost of inspections, cost 
of repairs over the lifetime and risk of failure. POD of the inspection technique is taken as 
a function of the crack size while the crack size is a function of the time as a result of the 
cyclic loading fatigue. Probability of failure is defined as probability of failure to detect a 
growing crack before reaching the critical size. The optimal selection of NDI technique 
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and associated inspection interval was obtained at the minimum value of the objective 
function keeping probability of failure not exceeding a predefined limit. The proposed 
model is explained in details in Chapter 5. 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides a statement of the objectives of 
the work, a brief review of the literature, and outlines the research methodology which 
has been followed in the thesis. Chapter 2 describes the different kinds of materials 
discontinuities and flaws, the purpose and goal of nondestructive inspection methods, 
issues related to nondestructive inspection, and acceptance criteria. The most common 
NDI techniques used for detecting these material discontinuities are introduced in Chapter 
3. Chapter 4 discusses the estimation of the crack growth rate as a result of loading and 
environmental conditions. This chapter further illustrates why cracks are considered more 
harmful than other kind of material discontinuities. The newly developed methodology 
for optimum nondestructive inspection is explained in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 shows how 
the analysis is applied in real life. Two relevant and realistic case studies involving 
welded joints are worked out. Finally, Chapter 7 provides a discussion of the results and 
conclusions derived from the study. 
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Chapter 2 
Materials Discontinuities 
E ngineering materials are composed of atoms and molecules that ideally have material 
continuity extending down into the microscopic scale. Uniformity of material and 
material properties is desired for most engineering applications. Design engineers assume 
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some level of structural continuity, homogeneity, and definition of material properties. 
However, absolute homogeneity and continuity does not usually exist in any engineering 
component. This chapter describes the different kinds of materials discontinuities and 
flaws. One of the primary goals of nondestructive inspection is to determine whether or 
not the discontinuities are acceptable. Accurate estimates of the size, location, and 
orientation of a discontinuity is most helpful and sometimes critical in the prevention of 
an impending failure. 
Spatially sharp departures from material homogeneity and continuity inside a component 
at any level of magnification are called discontinuities. Engineering materials always 
possess some discontinuities, which can be acceptable or not acceptable depending on the 
application. Examples of these discontinuities include voids, inclusions, laps, cracks, and 
local changes in microstructural features (e.g. arrangement of atoms and molecules, grain 
size, shape and orientation) which in tum affect on the behavior of the material in terms 
of physical properties (e.g., strength, toughness, ductility, hardness, corrosion resistance, 
wearability). 
Discontinuities in engineering components are unacceptable when they degrade the 
performance or durability of the structure below the expectations of design and when they 
challenge the operability, reliability, and life of a component. An evaluation of a 
discontinuity is usually made in reference to a design basis and may include a code or 
rule-based criteria for acceptance and rejection (for example, ASME Boiler and Pressure 
Vessel Code, Section XI, 2004 Edition). The evaluation of a discontinuity generally 
requires an adequate measurement of its size and location and identification of its 
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character. Discontinuities are evaluated by determining their location, number, shape, 
size, orientation, and type. Often, in NDI and Quality control anomaly, discontinuity, 
defect, flaw, cracks, imperfection, non-conformance are the terms used when the 
material/component tested deviate from requirement/ideality. An imperfection is a 
condition of being imperfect or a departure of a required condition or specification 
[Deardorff (2002)]. The term 'flaw' means a detectable unintentional discontinuity or a 
detectable imperfection in a physical or dimensional attribute of a part. A planar breach in 
continuity in a material is called a crack. The term 'nonconforming' means only that a 
part is deficient in one or more specified characteristics. If a flaw (imperfection or 
unintentional discontinuity) of such type, size, location, shape and/or orientation is 
unacceptable for continued service or unable to meet minimum applicable acceptance 
standards or specifications, it is called a defect. The term "defect" designates 
rejectability. Because in this chapter we are examining these phenomena outside the 
requirements of any specific code or standard, and we will not be discussing their 
limitations, we will use the term discontinuities or flaws. 
The origin and types of discontinuities depend primarily on the manufacturing processes 
and the service histories of engineering components. In some cases, the operational 
environment may induce the growth and development of preexisting di continuities. 
Discontinuities may originate at any manufacturing step and may be introduced during 
the component use. 
An understanding of the origin of discontinuities is useful in determining the type and 
features of discontinuities that may be expected in a component. 
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2.1 Classification of Materials Discontinuities 
Discontinuities may be classified by the stage in processing at which they are introduced 
as shown in Fig. 2.1 [Charles, 2003]: 
Discontinuities 
Pre-service Discontinuities In-service Discontinuities 
Inherent Manufacturing Creep 
Discontinuities Discontinuities Discontinuities 
L 
Fatigue Induced 
Discontinuities 
Corrosion-
Fatigue-Creep 
Interaction 
Fig. 2.1: Classification of Materials Discontinuities 
2.1.1 Pre-service discontinuities 
a) Inherent discontinuities 
Corrosion 
Induced 
Discontinuities 
_j 
Discontinuities that are generated in the extraction of raw material. The extraction 
of metals from ores requires processes that often carry over some of impurities 
from the rocks and chemical additions used in the refinement process. 
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b) Manufacturing discontinuities 
Discontinuities that are generated m the first forming steps of an alloy or 
generated in subsequent forming or manufacturing steps (e,g. , casting, forging, 
rolling, extrusion, welding). Casting is usually done in the primary production of 
metals and in the initial production of alloys. Casting is the starting point for many 
discontinuities in engineering components. Forms of casting discontinuities 
include voids, hrinkage porosity, gas porosity, slag and shrinkage cracks. During 
forging operation, material will lap over itself. The folded material will not fuse if 
the temperature is low and if the surface is contaminated with dirt. This type of 
discontinuity is called a fold or a lap. In forging operation, it is possible that the 
stress resulting from forming load may exceed the strength of the material causing 
the material to break apart. Thi load induced cracking is called a burst. Other 
forming techniques such as rolling and extrusion may generate some 
discontinuities such as cracks, laps and burst. 
During welding process, there are discontinuities within or adjacent to the weld. Common 
welding discontinuities are: 
1. Incomplete penetration (JP) or Lack of penetration (LOP) occurs when the weld 
metal fails to penetrate the joint. It is one of the most objectionable weld 
discontinuities. Lack of penetration allows a natural stress riser from which a 
crack may propagate. (Fig. 2.2). 
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Weld metal 
Incomplete penetration 
Fig. 2.2: Incomplete penetration in a welding joint 
11. Incomplete fusion is a condition where the weld metal does not properly fuse with 
the base metal (Fig. 2.3). 
Incomplete fusion 
Fig. 2.3: Incomplete fusion in a welding joint 
iii. Slag inclusions are nonmetallic solid material entrapped in weld metal or between 
weld and base metal (Fig. 2.4). 
Fig. 2.4: Slag inclusions in a welding joint 
tv. Porosity is the result of gas entrapment in the solidifying metal. This is the result 
of gas attempting to escape while the metal is still in a liquid state (Fig. 2.5). 
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Fig. 2.5: Porosity in a welding joint 
v. Internal concavity or suck back is a condition where the weld metal has contracted 
as it cools and has been drawn up into the root of the weld (Fig. 2.6). 
Internal concavity 
Fig. 2.6: Internal concavity in a welding joint 
vi. Internal or root undercut is an erosion of the base metal next to the root of the 
weld. (Fig. 2.7). 
Internal w1dercut 
Fig. 2. 7: Internal or root undercut in a welding joint 
vu. External or crown undercut is an erosion of the base metal next to the crown of 
the weld (Fig. 2.8). 
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External undercut ~ 
Fig. 2.8: External or crown undercut in a welding joint 
viii. Offset or mismatch is term associated with a condition where two pieces being 
welded together are not properly aligned (Fig. 2.9). 
Fig. 2.9: Offset or mismatch in a welding joint 
IX. Inadequate weld reinforcement is an area of a weld where the thickness of weld 
metal deposited is less than the thickness of the base material (Fig. 2.1 0). 
Inadequate weld reinforcemenl 
Fig. 2.10: Inadequate weld reinforcement in a welding joint 
x. Excess weld reinforcement is an area of a weld that has weld metal added in 
excess of that specified by engineering drawings and codes (Fig. 2.11 ). 
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Excess weld reinforcement 
Fig. 2.11: Excess weld reinforcment in a welding joint 
x1. Cracks are considered more harmful (Fig. 2.12). 
Cracks 
Fig. 2.12: Cracks in the radiograph of welding joint 
xu. Oxide inclusions are usually visible on the surface of material being welded (Fig. 
2.13) 
Oxide inc lusions 
Fig. 2.13 : Oxide inclusion in the radiograph of welding joint 
xm. Cold lap is a condition where the weld metal does not properly fuse with the base 
metal or the previous weld pass material (interpass cold lap) causes slightly 
molten puddle to flow into the base material without bonding (Fig. 2.14). 
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Fig. 2.14: Cold lap in a welding joint 
2.1.2 In-Service Discontinuities 
2.1.2.1 Fatigue Induced Discontinuities 
a) Cyclic Loading Fatigue (Mechanical Fatigue) 
Cyclic loading fatigue (mechanical fatigue), also simply known as fatigue is an 
extremely common failure mode and deserves considerable attention because it 
can inflict damage on a material at a stress level that is far less than the material's 
design limit. 
A material that fractures after being ubjected to a cyclic stress (fluctuating load) 
over a period of time is considered to have failed by fatigue. The maximum value 
of the cyclic stress (stress amplitude) for fatigue failure is less than the material's 
ultimate tensile strength. It is often the case that the maximum value of the cyclic 
stress is so low that if it were applied at a constant level the material would be 
able to easily support the load without incurring any damage. Cyclic loads cause 
the initiation and growth of a crack up to the material fractures when the crack is 
significant enough such that the material can no longer support the load. 
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The fatigue failure mechanism involves three stages: crack initiation, crack 
propagation, and material rupture. Similar to both ductile and brittle fracture, 
fatigue cracks are often initiated by material discontinuities. These discontinuities 
or initiation points act as stress raisers where the applied stress concentrates until 
it exceeds the local strength of the material and produces a crack. The best way to 
prevent fatigue failure is to keep fatigue cracks from initiating, which can be 
accomplished by removing or minimizing crack initiators, or by minimizing the 
stress amplitude. Once fatigue cracks have been initiated they will seek out the 
easiest or weakest path to propagate through the material. Therefore, minimizing 
the number of internal material discontinuities, such as voids and inclusions, will 
increase the time it takes a crack to propagate. Finally, when the crack has 
weakened the material to a point such that it can no longer support the applied 
load it will rupture. 
Fatigue is not so much dependent on the time as it is on the number of cycles. A 
cycle consists of an applied stress being increased from a starting value (in some 
cases, zero or negative) up to a maximum positive value (material loaded in 
positive direction) and then decreasing past the starting point down to a minimum 
value (in some cases this is a maximum negative loading), and finally back up to 
the starting value. This cycle is illustrated in Fig. (2.15) where there is positive 
and negative loading. Moreover, the stress cycles do not need to be symmetric, but 
can be randomly changing. Fenous or iron alloy materials do have a fatigue 
(endurance) limit, which is the stress level (amplitude) under which no failure will 
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occur regardless of the number of cycles. On the other hand, by increasing the 
stress amplitude, the fatigue failure will commence after a smaller number of 
cycle . 
Stress Amplitude 
/ 
(+) 
Stress 
(-) 
- - - - - - - -- _\. 1Cycle --r---------
' 
Time 
Fig. 2.15: Fatigue Loading Cycle 
b) Thermal Fatigue 
Simple temperature fluctuations or repeated heating and cooling can impose 
stresse on a material leading to fatigue damage and potentially failure. Material 
generally exhibit a dimensional change or strain to some extent in respon e to 
temperature changes. This response can be significant in some materials, 
especially metals, and can induce thermal stresses on the material if it i 
mechanically confined in orne way. When a material is exposed to conditions of 
fluctuating temperatures it can cause cyclic fatigue loading, which can re ult in 
crack growth and possibly fracture. This process is referred to as thermal fatigue. 
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Mechanical loading is not required for thermal fatigue to occur, and this failure 
mode is different from fatigue under fluctuating stress at high temperature. If there 
is a temperature gradient within the material that is exposed to fluctuating 
temperatures, it may experience thermal fatigue since different sections of the 
material' s microstructure will respond unequally to the temperature changes. 
Failure from thermal fatigue can occur not only from fracture but also from a 
permanent change in shape. 
Thermal fatigue is a significant concern in certain applications such as internal 
combustion engines, heat exchangers, and turbine engine blades. 
2.1.2.2 Creep Discontinuities 
High temperature operation of metals and alloys for long periods of time may 
generate an in- ervice induced cracking called creep cracking. This condition may 
occur even if the stresses are relatively low. The cracks are usually preceded by 
discontinuities in the form of creep voids which are small and distributed. The creep 
voids grow and then cracking links these voids. 
2.1.2.3 Corrosion Induced Discontinuities 
Corrosion is the deterioration of a metal or alloy and its prope1ties due to a chemical 
or electrochemical reaction with the surrounding environment. The most serious 
consequence of corrosion is a component or system failure. Failure can occur either 
by sufficient material property degradation, such that the component or structure is 
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rendered unable to perform its intended function, or by fracture that originates from 
or is propagated by corrosive effects. 
While corrosion manifests itself in many different forms and through various 
environments and mechanisms, only the most significant forms are discussed in this 
chapter. The following sections contain discussions on failures resulting from 
uniform, galvanic, crevice, pitting, intergranular, erosion COITosion, hydrogen 
damage and stress corrosion cracking. In addition to discussions on corrosion-
fatigue interaction (corrosion fatigue) and creep-fatigue interaction. 
a) Uniform Corrosion (General Corrosion) 
Uniform corrosion (general corrosion) is a generalized corrostve attack that 
occurs over a large surface area of a material. The result is a thinning of the 
material until failure occurs. Uniform corrosion can also lead to changes in 
surface properties such as increased surface roughness and friction, which may 
cause component failure especially in the case of moving parts that require 
lubricity. 
In most cases corrosion is inevitable. Therefore, mitigating its effects or 
reducing the corrosion rate is essential to ensuring material longevity. Protecting 
against uniform corrosion can often be accomplished through selection of a 
material that is best suited for the anticipated environment. The selection of 
materials for uniform corrosion resistance should simply take into consideration 
the susceptibility of the metal to the type of environment that will be 
encountered. Aside from selecting a material that is resistant to uniform 
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corrosion, protection schemes such as organic or metallic coatings can be 
implemented wherever feasible. There are also coatings where additional 
elements, such as chromium, are incorporated for corrosion resistance. When 
coatings are not used, surface treatments that artificially produce the metal oxide 
layer prior to exposure to the environment will result in a more uniform layer 
with a controlled thickness. A uniform oxide layer can provide effective 
corrosion resistance for some materials. 
Also, vapor phase inhibitors may be used m such applications as boilers to 
adjust the pH level of the environment, thus reducing the rate of corrosion. 
b) Galvanic Corrosion 
Galvanic corrosion is a form of corrosive attack that occurs when two dissimilar 
metals (e.g. stainless steel and magnesium) are electrically connected, either 
through physically touching each other or through an electrically conducting 
medium, such as an electrolyte. When this occurs, an electrochemical cell can be 
established, resulting in an increased rate of oxidation of the more anodic 
material (lower electrical potential). The opposing metal, the cathode, will 
consequently receive a boost in its resistance to corrosion. Galvanic corro ion is 
usually observed to be greatest near the surface where the two dissimilar metals 
are in contact. 
There are a number of driving forces that influence the occurrence of galvanic 
corrosion and the rate at which it occurs. 
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Among these influencing factor are the difference in the electrical potentials of 
the coupled metals, the relative area of each metal, the system geometry, and the 
environment to which the system is exposed. 
c) Crevice Corrosion 
Crevice corrosion occurs as a result of water or other liquids getting trapped in 
localized stagnant areas creating an enclosed corrosive environment. This 
commonly occurs under fasteners, gaskets, washers and in joints or in other 
components with small gaps. Crevice corrosion can also occur under debri 
built-up on surfaces, sometimes referred to as "poultice corrosion". Poultice 
COITosion can be quite severe, due to a gradually increasing acidity in the crevice 
area. 
Several factors including crevice gap width, depth, and the swface ratios of 
materials affect the severity or rate of crevice corrosion. Tighter gap , for 
example, have been known to increase the rate of crevice corrosion of stainless 
steels in chloride environments. The larger crevice depth and greater surface 
area of metals will generally increase the rate of corrosion. 
To protect against problems with crevice corrosion, systems should be designed 
to minimize areas likely to trap moisture, other liquids, or debris. For example, 
welded joints can be used instead of fastened joints to eliminate a possible 
crevice. Where crevices are unavoidable, metals with a greater resistance to 
crevice corrosion in the intended environment should be selected. Crevice areas 
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should be sealed to prevent the ingress of water. Also, a regular cleaning 
schedule should be implemented to remove any debris build up. 
d) Pitting Corrosion 
Pitting corrosion, also simply known as pitting, is an extremely localized fmm 
of corrosion that occurs when a corrosive medium attacks a metal at specific 
points causing small holes or pits to form. 
This usually happens when a protective coating or oxide film is perforated, due 
to mechanical damage or chemical degradation. Pitting can be one of the most 
dangerous forms of corrosion because it is difficult to anticipate and prevent, 
relatively difficult to detect, occurs very rapidly, and penetrates a metal without 
causing it to lose a significant amount of weight. Failure of a metal due to the 
effects of pitting corrosion can occur very suddenly. Pitting can have side effects 
too, for example, cracks may initiate at the edge of a pit due to an increase in the 
local stress. 
e) Intergranular Corrosion 
Intergranular corrosion attacks the interior of metals along grain boundaries. It i 
associated with impurities, which tend to deposit at grain boundaries, and/or a 
difference in crystallographic phase precipitated at grain boundaries. Heating of 
some metals can cause a "sensitization" or an increase in the level of 
inhomogeniety at gram boundaries. Therefore, some heat treatments and 
weldments can result in a propensity for intergranular corrosion. Some metals 
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may also become sensitized while in operation if used at a high enough 
temperature to cause such changes in internal crystallographic structure. 
Intergranular corrosion can occur in many alloys, but stainless steels, as well a 
some aluminum and nickel-based alloys, are predominantly susceptible. 
Stainless steels, especially ferritic stainless steels, have been found to become 
sensitized, particularly after welding. Aluminum alloys also suffer intergranular 
attack as a result of precipitates at grain boundaries that are more active. 
0 Erosion Corrosion 
Erosion corrosion IS a form of attack resulting from the interaction of an 
electrolytic solution in motion relative to a metal surface. It has typically been 
associated with small solid particles dispersed within a liquid stream. The fluid 
motion causes wear and abrasion, increasing rates of corrosion over uniform 
(non-motion) corrosion under the same conditions. 
Erosion corrosion is evident in pipelines, cooling systems, valves, boiler 
systems, propellers, impellers, as well as numerous other components. 
Specialized types of erosion corrosion occur as a result of impingement and 
cavitation. Impingement refers to a directional change of the solution, whereby a 
greater force is exhibited on a surface such as the outside curve of an elbow 
joint. Cavitation is the phenomenon of collapsing vapor bubbles, which can 
cause surface damage if they repeatedly hit one particular location on a metal. 
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There are several factors that influence the resistance of a material to erosion 
corrosion including hardness, surface smoothness, fluid velocity, fluid density, 
angle of impact, and the general corrosion resistance of the material to the 
environment. 
Materials with higher hardness values typically resist erosion corrosion better 
than those that have a lower value. 
g) Hydrogen Damage 
There are a number of different ways that hydrogen can damage metallic 
materials, resulting from the combined factors of hydrogen and residual or 
tensile stresses. Hydrogen damage can result in cracking, embrittlement, loss of 
ductility, blistering and flaking, and microperforation. 
Hydrogen induced cracking (HIC) refers to the cracking of a ductile alloy when 
under constant stress and where hydrogen gas is pre ent. Hydrogen is absorbed 
into areas of high stress producing the observed damage. A related phenomenon, 
hydrogen embrittlement, is the brittle fracture of a ductile alloy during plastic 
deformation in a hydrogen gas containing environment. 
In both cases, a loss of tensile ductility occurs with metals exposed to hydrogen 
which results in a significant decrease in elongation and reduction in area. It is 
most often observed in low strength alloys, but also occurs in steels, stainless 
steels, aluminum alloys, nickel alloys, and titanium alloys. 
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Another form of damage occurs when high pressure hydrogen attacks carbon 
and low-alloy steels at high temperatures. The hydrogen will diffuse into the 
metal and react with carbon resulting in the formation of methane. This in tum 
results in decarburization of the alloy and possible crack formation. 
h) Stress Corrosion Cracking 
Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) is an environmentally induced cracking 
phenomenon that sometimes occurs when susceptible metals are subjected to a 
tensile stress and a corrosive environment simultaneously. This is not to be 
confused with similar phenomena such as hydrogen embrittlement, in which the 
metal is embrittled by hydrogen, often resulting in the formation of cracks. 
Moreover, SCC is not defined as the cause of cracking that occurs when the 
surface of the metal is corroded resulting in the creation of a nucleating point for 
a crack. Rather, it is a synergistic effort of a corrosive agent and a static tress. 
Another form of corrosion similar to SCC, although with a subtle difference, is 
corrosion fatigue. The key difference is that SCC occurs with a static stress, 
while corrosion fatigue occurs under a dynamic or cyclic tress. 
Stress corrosion cracking is a process that takes place within the material, where 
the cracks propagate through the internal structure, usually leaving the surface 
unharmed [Fang, et. al. (2002)]. Aside from an applied mechanical stress, a 
residual, thermal, or welding stress along with the appropriate corrosive agent 
may also be sufficient to promote SCC. Stress corrosion cracking is a dangerous 
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form of corrosion because it can be difficult to detect, and it can occur at stre s 
levels which fall within the range that the metal is designed to handle. 
Stress corrosion cracking is dependent on environmental factors including 
temperature, solution, and stres , as well as the metallic structure and 
composition. However, certain types of alloys are more susceptible to SCC in 
particular environments, while other alloys are more resistant to that same 
environment. Increasing the temperature of a system often works to accelerate 
the rate of SCC. The presence of chlorides or oxygen in the environment can 
also significantly influence the occurrence and rate of SCC [Gooch, T. G. 
(1986)]. 
The magnitude of SCC can be measured experimentally based on a rate of crack 
propagation. This measure identifies how quickly a material may fail under an 
applied load in corrosive conditions. The susceptibility of a material to SCC 
may also be estimated based on a critical stress value that will propagate a crack 
under corrosive conditions. This factor is called the stress corrosion cracking 
stress intensity factor, K1scc which quantifies the phenomenon as it is theca e in 
fatigue crack growth (FCG) which can be quantified using the stress intensity 
factor for fatigue crack growth, KlFcG, (for fatigue crack growth assessment, see 
Chapter 4). K1scc is dependent on material properties and it can be directionally 
dependent, and the designer or engineer needs to be careful in applying it to the 
proper direction of the material under consideration. Furthermore, K1scc is 
31 
environmentally dependent, and as a result the environment in which the test 
data was produced should be taken into consideration. 
2.1.2.4 Corrosion-Fatigue-Creep Interaction 
In some applications, there is an interaction between two or more degradation 
mechanisms (fatigue, corrosion and creep). For example, corrosion fatigue and 
creep-fatigue interaction as explained below: 
a) Creep-Fatigue Interaction 
At elevated temperatures creep and fatigue can act simultaneously to produce a 
concerted, harmful effect on a material. A material operating in high 
temperature conditions can experience both creep strains and cyclic strains that 
can seriously affect the material's lifetime. For example, if a material 
experiences creep strains while undergoing fatigue cycling, its fatigue life can 
be greatly reduced. Similarly, if a material experiences fatigue cycling while 
undergoing creep, its creep life can be significantly reduced. 
b) Corrosion Fatigue 
Corrosion fatigue is the environmentally-assisted mechanical degradation of a 
material due to the combined effects of corrosion and fatigue (a direct result of 
cyclic stress loading). 
SCC occurs under static stress while corrosion fatigue occurs under a cyclic 
stress (part of which is tensile stress). Corrosion fatigue is a potential cause for 
the failure of many types of metals and alloys in various types of environments. 
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Materials that expenence corrosion fatigue essentially exhibit a decrease in 
fatigue strength due to the effects of electrochemical degradation (corrosive 
environment). The stress required for both crack initiation and propagation i 
lower in corrosive environments. 
The crack growth rate can be much higher in a corro ive environment than it i 
in a non-corrosive environment. Therefore, the fatigue life of a material i 
shortened if it is simultaneously exposed to a corrosive environment and fatigue 
conditions. 
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Chapter 3 
Non-Destructive Inspection (NDI) Techniques 
b is chapter provides a review of the most common non-destructive inspection 
techniques such as ultrasonic, magnetic, radiographic and thermal inspection. 
Effectiveness, advantages, disadvantages, main uses, and limitations of these techniques 
are also discussed in this chapter. This information is subsequently used in the proposed 
optimization model (Chapter 5) for selecting an optimum NDI technique and its 
associated optimum inspection interval. The general definition of nondestructive 
inspection (NDI) is an examination that is performed on an object to determine the 
absence or presence of flaws that may have an effect on the usefulness or serviceability of 
that object or to measure other object characteristics (e.g. size, dimension, alloy content) 
[Charles 2003]. Nondestructive examination (NDE), nondestructive evaluation (NDE) 
and nondestructive testing (NDT) are also expressions commonly used to describe this 
technology [Charles 2003]. Although NDI cannot guarantee that failures will not occur, it 
plays a significant role in minimizing the possibilities of failure. 
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A variety of NDI techniques are available for detection and characterization of defects in 
materials. All NDI techniques are based on physical principles. Nearly every form of 
energy is used as probing medium in NDI. Likewise nearly every property of the 
materials to be inspected has been made the basis for some method or technique of NDI. 
In general, NDI methods involve subjecting the material (being examined) to some form 
of external energy source (e.g. X-rays, ultrasonic, thermal wave, electromagnetic fields) 
and analyzing the detected response signals (refracted energy, induced voltage and 
diffracted energy). 
NDI techniques can be used for: [Charles 2003] 
1. Flaw detection and evaluation 
11. Leakage detection 
111. Location determination 
tv. Dimensional measurements 
v. Structure and microstructure characterization 
v1. Estimation of mechanical and physical properties 
v11. Strain and dynamic response measurements 
vn1. Material sorting and chemical composition determination 
3.1 Nondestructive Versus Destructive Tests 
Destructive testing has been defined as a form of mechanical test (primarily destructive) 
of materials where by certain specific characteristics of the material can evaluated 
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quantitatively. In some cases, the test specimens being tested are subjected to controlled 
conditions that simulate service. Such destructive tests can provide very useful 
information, especially relating to the material's design considerations and useful life. 
Destructive testing may be dynamic or static. It provides data relative to the material 
attributes such as ultimate tensile strength, yield point, ductility, elongation 
characteristics, fatigue life, corrosion resistance, toughness, and impact resistance. 
Although it is assumed in many cases that the test specimen is representative of the 
material from which it has been taken, it cannot be said with 100% reliability that the 
balance of the material will have exactly the same characteristics as that test specimen. 
Key benefits of destructive testing include: 
i. Reliable and accurate data from the test specimen 
n. Extremely useful data for design purposes 
n1. Information can be used to establish standards and specifications 
tv. Data achieved through destructive testing is usually quantitative 
v. Typically, various service conditions are capable of being measured 
VI. Useful life can generally be predicted 
Limitations of destructive testing include: 
1. Data applies only to the specimen being examined 
n. Most destructive test specimen cannot be used once the test is complete 
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iii. Many destructive test require large, expensive equipment m a laboratory 
environment 
Benefits of nondestructive testing include: 
1. The part i not changed or altered and can be used after examination 
11. Every item or a large portion of the material can be examined with no adver e 
consequences 
iii. Material can be examined for condition intemal and at the erv1ce 
1v. Part can be examined while in service 
v. Many NDI methods are portable and can be taken to the object to be examined 
v1. Nonde tructive testing is cost effective 
Limitation of nonde tructive testing include: 
1. It i usually quite operator dependent 
11. NDI method do not generally provide quantitative data 
iii. Orientation of flaws must be considered 
IV. Evaluation of some test result are subjective and subject to dispute 
v. While most methods are cost effective, some, such as radiography, can be 
expensive 
vi. Defined procedures that have been qualified are essential 
vn. It i usually quite dependent on operator qualification. 
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In conclusion, there are obvious benefits for requiring both nonde tructive and de tructive 
testing. Each is capable of providing extremely useful information, and when used jointly 
can be very valuable to the designer when considering useful life and application of the 
part. 
3.2 Most Common NDI Techniques [Charles (2003)] 
3.2.1 Visual Inspection 
Visual inspection plays an important role in quick assessment of the quality of the 
inspected component and to identify various defects. Developments in image processing, 
artificial intelligence, video technology and other related field have significantly 
improved the capability of visual techniques. Present day demand for higher performance 
and faster production exceed the abilities of visual tests by humans. Consequently, visual 
inspections made by human eye are being replaced by automated visual inspection using 
optical instruments and unstaffed inspection stations. Such aspects are usually referred to 
as machine vision. 
3.2.1.1 Instruments for Visual Inspection 
The human eye is an excellent sensor and with that, it is possible to easily perceive many 
material characteri tics (eg. shapes, colours, gloss, shades) and examining cleanliness, 
misalignments and other mismatches, foreign objects. The human eye is an important 
component for performing visual NDI. 
Optical aids (eg. Borescopes, fiberscopes, videoimagescopes) are usually recommended 
for visual inspection, essentially for magnification purpose and also for inspecting the 
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inaccessible areas (e.g inside surfaces of tubes, geometrical imperfections such as weld 
convexity and concavity of weld joints need to be detected in inaccessible regions). Using 
the 3-D graphic measurement system, it i possible to measure dimensions such as length 
and width on the images very accurate] y 
In recent times, with the availability of flexible fibre-optic borescopes, cameras, and 
computer based image processing software, it is possible to examine comers, bent 
surfaces, and inaccessible surfaces. Using these instruments, it is possible to take sharp 
and clear images of parts and interior surfaces and make quantitative evaluations. The 
diameter and length of the flexiscopes are usually adapted depending on the requirements 
and the dimensions of the test object. Selection of a visual instrument mainly depends on 
factors such as the object geometry and the access, expected defect size and resolution 
requirements. 
The five basic elements m a visual test are the test object, the inspector, the optical 
instrument, illumination and recording. Each of these elements interacts with the others 
and affects the test results. The objective distance, object size, discontinuity 1ze, 
reflectivity, entry port size, object thickness and direction of view are all critical aspects 
of the test object that affect the visual test. 
ln many situations, in order to aid vision, magnification with power ranging from 1.5X to 
2000X is employed. Depending on the working distance and the field of view various 
lower, medium and high power magnification systems (microscopes) are used. With high 
power systems, it would be possible to achieve resolution of a few microns. The defect 
size usually determines the magnification and resolution required for visual inspection. 
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For example, greater resolution is required to detect hairline cracks in welds than to detect 
an undercut. 
3.2.2 Penetrant Inspection 
Penetrant inspection (liquid penetrant inspection) is a method that is used to reveal 
surface breaking flaws by bleed out of a colored or fluorescent dye from the flaw. The 
technique is based on the ability of a liquid to be drawn into a "clean" surface breaking 
flaw by capillary action. After a period of time called the "dwell," excess surface 
penetrant is removed and a developer applied. This acts as a blotter. It draws the 
penetrant from the flaw to reveal it presence. Colored (contrast) penetrants require good 
white light, while fluorescent penetrants need to be used in darkened conditions with an 
ultraviolet "black light". 
3.2.2.1 Basic Processing Steps of a Penetrant Inspection 
1. Surface Preparation: One of the most critical steps of a liquid penetrant inspection 
is the surface preparation. The surface must be free of oil, grease, water, or other 
contaminants that may prevent penetrant from entering flaws. 
11. Penetrant Application: Once the surface has been thoroughly cleaned and dried, 
the penetrant material is applied by spraying, brushing, or immersing the part in a 
penetrant bath. 
111. Penetrant Dwell: The penetrant is left on the surface for a sufficient time to allow 
as much penetrant as possible to be drawn from or to seep into a flaw. Penetrant 
dwell time is the total time that the penetrant is in contact with the part surface. 
40 
Dwell times are usually recommended by the penetrant producers or required by 
the specification being followed. The times vary depending on the application, 
penetrant materials used, the material, the form of the material being inspected, 
and the type of flaw being inspected for. Minimum dwell times typically range 
from five to 60 minutes. Generally, there is no harm in using a longer penetrant 
dwell time as long as the penetrant is not allowed to dry. The ideal dwell time is 
often determined by experimentation and may be very specific to a particular 
application. 
IV. Excess Penetrant Removal: This is the most delicate part of the inspection 
procedure because the excess penetrant must be removed from the surface of the 
sample while removing as little penetrant as possible from flaws. This step may 
involve cleaning with a solvent, direct rinsing with water, or first treating the part 
with an emulsifier and then rinsing with water. 
v. Developer Application: A thin layer of developer is then applied to the sample to 
draw penetrant trapped in flaws back to the surface where it will be visible. 
Developers come in a variety of forms that may be applied by dusting (dry 
powdered), dipping, or spraying (wet developers). 
v1. Indication Development: The developer is allowed to stand on the part surface for 
a period of time sufficient to permit the extraction of the trapped penetrant out of 
any surface flaws. This development time is usually a minimum of 10 
minutes. Significantly longer times may be necessary for tight cracks. 
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vn. Inspection: Inspection is then performed under appropriate lighting to detect 
indications from any flaws which may be present. 
vn1. Clean Surface: The final step in the process is to thoroughly clean the part surface 
to remove the developer from the acceptable pruts. 
3.2.2.2 Common Uses of Penetrant Inspection 
Penetrant inspection (PI) is one of the most widely used nondestructive inspection (NDI) 
techniques. Its popularity can be attributed to two main factors: its relative ease of use and 
its flexibility. PI can be used to detect surface flaws of almost any material provided that 
its surface is not extremely rough or porou . Materials that ru·e commonly inspected u ing 
PI are, for example, metals, glass, many ceramic materials, rubber, plastics. 
PI offers flexibility in performing inspections because it can be applied in a large variety 
of applications. Penetrant materials can be applied with a spray can or a cotton swab to 
inspect for flaws known to occur in a specific area or it can be applied by dipping or 
spraying to quickly inspect large areas. One of the major limitations of a penetrant 
inspection is that flaws must be open to the surface. 
3.2.2.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Penetrant Inspection 
Like all nondestructive inspection methods, liquid penetrant inspection has both 
advantages and disadvantages. The primary advantages when compared to other NDI 
methods are summarized below [Charles (2003)]. 
1. The method has high sensitivity to small surface discontinuities. 
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11. The method has few material limitations, i.e. metallic and nonmetallic, magnetic 
and nonmagnetic, and conductive and nonconductive materials may be inspected. 
111. Large area and large volumes of parts/materials can be inspected rapidly and at 
low co t. 
1v. Parts with complex geometric shapes are routinely inspected. 
v. Indications are produced directly on the surface of the part and constitute a visual 
representation of the flaw. 
vi. Aerosol spray cans make penetrant materials very portable. 
v11. Penetrant materials and associated equipment are relatively inexpensive. 
The primary disadvantages are summarized below: 
1. Only surface breaking flaw can be detected. 
11. Only materials with a relatively nonporous surface can be in pected. 
111. Precleaning is critical since contaminants can mask Uiface flaws. 
1v. Metal mearing from machining, grinding, and grit or sand blasting must be 
removed prior to LPI. 
v. The in pector must have direct acces to the surface being inspected. 
VI. Surface finish and roughness can affect inspection sensitivity. 
vn. Multiple process operation mu t be performed and controlled. 
vn1. Post cleaning of acceptable parts or material is required. 
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IX. Chemical handling and proper disposal is required. 
3.2.2.4 Penetrant Inspection Materials 
Today' penetrants are carefully formulated to produce the level of ensitivity desired by 
the inspector. To perform well, a penetrant must posse s a number of important 
characteristics. A penetrant must: 
1. Spread easily over the surface of the material being inspected to provide complete 
coverage. 
II. Be drawn into surface breaking flaw by capillary action. 
HI. Remain in the flaw but remove easily from the surface of the part. 
IV. Remain fluid so it can be drawn back to the surface of the part through the drying 
and developing steps. 
v. Be highly visible or fluore ce brightly to produce easy to see indications. 
v1. Not be harmful to the material being tested or the inspector. 
Penetrant materials come in two basic types. These types are listed below: 
Type 1 - Fluorescent Penetrants (Fluore cence is the property of a substance, such as 
fluorite, of producing light while it is being acted upon by radiant energy, such a 
ultraviolet ray or X-rays) 
Type 2 - Visible Penetrants 
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Ultraviolet light 
Fig. 3.1: Fluorescent penetrant inspection 
Fluorescent penetrants (Fig. 3.1) contain a dye or several dyes that fluore ce when 
exposed to ultraviolet light (sometimes referred to as "black light"). Visible penetrants 
(Fig. 3.2) contain a red dye that provides high contrast against the white developer 
background. Fluorescent penetrant systems are more sensitive than visible penetrant 
systems because the eye is drawn to the glow of the fluorescing indication. However, 
visible penetrants do not require a darkened area and an ultraviolet light in order to make 
an inspection. Visible penetrants are also less vulnerable to contamination from things 
such as cleaning fluid that can significantly reduce the strength of a fluorescent 
indication. 
/ 
L__ ____ _yl/ 
Fig. 3.2: Visible penetrant inspection 
3.2.2.5 Developers 
The role of the developer is to pull the trapped penetrant material out of flaws and spread 
it out on the surface of the part so it can be seen by an inspector (Fig. 3.3). The fine 
developer particles both reflect and refract the incident ultraviolet light, allowing more of 
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it to interact with the penetrant, causing more efficient fluorescence. The developer also 
allows more light to be emitted through the same mechanism. Another function that some 
developers perform is to create a white background so there is a greater degree of contrast 
between the indication and the surrounding background. 
/ 
Fig. 3.3: Developer used in penetrant inspection 
3.2.2.6 Application of the Penetrant 
The application of the penetrant is the step of the process that requires the least amount of 
control. As long a the surface being in pected receives a generous coating of penetrant, it 
really doesn't matter how the penetrant is applied. Generally, the application method is an 
economic or convenience decision. 
It is important that the part be thoroughly cleaned and dried. Any contaminates or 
moisture on the surface of the part or within a flaw can prevent the penetrant material 
from entering the flaw. The temperature of the inspected surface can have an effect on the 
result. The recommended range of temperature depends on the properties of the used 
penetrant. 
3.2.3 Magnetic Particle Inspection (MPI) Technique 
Magnetic particle inspection (MPI) i a nondestructive inspection technique used for flaw 
detection. MPI is fast and relatively easy to apply, and part surface preparation is not a 
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critical as it is for some other NDI techniques. These characteristics make MPI one of the 
most widely utilized nondestructive inspection methods. 
MPI uses magnetic fields and small magnetic particles (i.e. iron filings) to detect flaws in 
components. The only requirement from an inspectability tandpoint is that the 
component being inspected must be made of a ferromagnetic material such as iron, 
nickel, cobalt, or some of their alloys. Ferromagnetic materials are materials that can be 
magnetized to a level that will allow the inspection to be effective. 
The method is used to inspect a variety of product forms including castings, forgings, and 
weldments. Many different industries use magnetic particle inspection for determining a 
component's fitness-for-use. Some examples of industries that use magnetic particle 
inspection are the structural steel, automotive, petrochemical, power generation, and 
aerospace industries. Underwater inspection is another area where magnetic particle 
inspection may be used to test items such as offshore structures and underwater pipeline . 
3.2.3.1 Basic Principles of MPI 
In theory, magnetic particle inspection (MPI) is a relatively simple concept. It can be 
considered as a combination of two nondestructive inspection methods: magnetic flux 
leakage inspection and visual inspection. 
Fig. 3.4: Magnetic field in and around a bar magnet 
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Consider the case of a bar magnet (Fig. 3.4). It has a magnetic field in and around the 
magnet. Any place that a magnetic line of force exits or enters the magnet is called a pole. 
A pole where a magnetic line of force exits the magnet is called a north pole and a pole 
where a line of force enters the magnet is called a south pole. 
When a bar magnet is broken in the center of its length, two complete bar magnets with 
magnetic poles on each end of each piece will result. If the magnet is just cracked but not 
broken completely in two, a north and south pole will form at each edge of the crack. The 
magnetic field exits the north pole and reenters at the south pole (Fig. 3.5). 
Fig. 3.5: Flux leakage at the crack in magnetic inspection 
The magnetic field spreads out when it encounters the small air gap created by the crack 
because the air cannot support as much magnetic field per unit volume as the magnet can. 
When the field spreads out, it appears to leak out of the material and thus is called a flux 
leakage field. 
If iron particles are sprinkled on a cracked magnet, the particles will be attracted to and 
cluster not only at the poles at the ends of the magnet, but also at the poles at the edges of 
the crack (Fig. 3.6). This cluster of particles is much easier to ee than the actual crack 
and this is the basis for magnetic particle inspection. 
48 
Magnetic particles 
Magnetic field lines 
N s 
Fig. 3.6: Cluster of iron particles at the edges of the crack in magnetic particle inspection 
The first step in a magnetic particle inspection is to magnetize the component that is to be 
inspected. If any flaws on or near the surface are present, the flaws will create a leakage 
field. After the component has been magnetized, iron particles, either in a dry or wet 
suspended form, are applied to the surface of the magnetized part. The particles will be 
attracted and cluster at the flux leakage fields, thus forming a visible indication that the 
inspector can detect. 
3.2.3.2 Magnetic Field Orientation and Flaw Detectability 
To properly inspect a component for cracks or other flaws, it i imp01tant to understand 
that the orientation between the magnetic lines of force and the flaw is very important. 
There are two general types of magnetic fields that can be established within a 
component. A longitudinal magnetic field has magnetic lines of force that run parallel to 
the long axis of the part. Longitudinal magnetization of a component can be accomplished 
using the longitudinal field set up by a coil or solenoid. It can also be accomplished using 
permanent magnets or electromagnets (Fig. 3.7). 
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Fig. 3. 7: longitudinal magnetic field 
A circular magnetic field has magnetic lines of force that run circumferentially around the 
perimeter of a part. A circular magnetic field is induced in an article by either passing 
current through the component or by passing current through a conductor surrounded by 
the component (Fig. 3.8). 
Fig. 3.8: Circular magnetic field 
The type of magnetic field established is determined by the method used to magnetize the 
specimen. Being able to magnetize the part in two directions is important because the best 
detection of flaws occurs when the lines of magnetic force are established at right angles 
to the longest dimension of the flaw. This orientation creates the largest disruption of the 
magnetic field within the part and the greatest flux leakage at the surface of the part. As 
can be seen in Fig. 3.9, if the magnetic field is parallel to the flaw, the field will see little 
disruption and no flux leakage field will be produced. 
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Fig. 3.9: Effect of flaw orientation on detectability using 
magnetic inspection (longitudinal magnetic field) 
An orientation of 45 to 90 degrees between the magnetic field and the flaw is necessary to 
form an indication. Since flaws may occur in various and unknown directions, each part is 
normally magnetized in two directions at right angles to each other. If the component 
below is considered, it is known that passing current through the part from end to end will 
establish a circular magnetic field that will be 90 degrees to the direction of the current. 
Therefore, flaws that have a significant dimension in the direction of the current 
(longitudinal flaws) should be detectable. Alternately, transverse-type flaws will not be 
detectable with circular magnetization (Fig. 3.10). 
Magnetic field Crack will not be detected 
Current ___. Current 
Crack will be detected 
Fig. 3.10: Effect of flaw orientation on detectability using 
magnetic inspection (circular magnetic field) 
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3.2.3.3 Magnetization of Ferromagnetic Materials 
To properly inspect a part for cracks or other flaws, it is important to become familiar 
with the different types of magnetic fields and the equipment used to generate them. As 
discussed previously, one of the primary requirements for detecting a flaw in a 
ferromagnetic material is that the magnetic field induced in the pru.t must intercept the 
flaw at a 45 to 90 degree angle. Flaws that are normal (90 degrees) to the magnetic field 
will produce the strongest indications because they disrupt more of the magnet flux. 
Therefore, for proper inspection of a component, it is important to be able to establish a 
magnetic field in at least two directions. A variety of equipment exists to establish the 
magnetic field for MPI. Some equipment is designed to be portable so that inspections 
can be made in the field and some is designed to be stationary for ease of inspection in the 
laboratory or manufacturing facility. 
There are a variety of methods that can be used to establish a magnetic field in a 
component for evaluation using magnetic particle inspection. It is common to classify the 
magnetizing methods as either direct or indirect. 
3.2.3.4 Magnetization Using Direct Induction (Direct Magnetization) 
With direct magnetization, current is passed directly through the component. Recall that 
whenever current flows, a magnetic field is produced. Using the right-hand rule, it is 
known that the magnetic lines of flux form normal to the direction of the cun·ent and form 
a circular field in and around the conductor. When using the direct magnetization method, 
care must be taken to ensure that good electrical contact is established and maintained 
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between the test equipment and the test component. Improper contact can result in arcing 
that may damage the component. It is also possible to overheat components in areas of 
high resistance such as the contact points and in areas of small cross-sectional area. 
There are several ways that direct magnetization is commonly accomplished. One way 
involves clamping the component between two electrical contacts in a special piece of 
equipment. Current is passed through the component and a circular magnetic field is 
established in and around the component, Fig. 3.11. When the magnetizing cLment 1s 
stopped, a residual magnetic field will remain within the component. The strength of the 
induced magnetic field is proportional to the amount of cutTent passed through the 
component. 
t 
Electric 
Current 
Inspected component 
Electric 
Current 
Fig. 3.11: Direct magnetization by clamping the component 
between two electrical contacts. 
A second technique involves using clamps or prods, which are attached or placed in 
contact with the component, Fig. 3.12. Electrical current flows through the component 
from contact to contact. The current sets up a circular magnetic field around the path of 
the current. 
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Fig. 3.12: Direct magnetization by placing electrical prods in contact with the component. 
3.2.3.5 Magnetization Using Indirect Induction (Indirect Magnetization) 
Indirect magnetization is accomplished by using a strong external magnetic field to 
establish a magnetic field within the component. As with direct magnetization, there are 
several ways that indirect magnetization can be accomplished. 
The use of permanent magnets is a low cost method of establishing a magnetic field. 
However, their use is limited due to lack of control of the field strength and the difficulty 
of placing and removing strong permanent magnets from the component. 
Electromagnets in the form of an adjustable horseshoe magnet (called a yoke), Fig. 3.13, 
eliminate the problems associated with permanent magnets and are used extensively in 
industry. Electromagnets only exhibit a magnetic flux when electric current is flowing 
around the soft iron core. When the magnet is placed on the component, a magnetic field 
is established between the north and south poles of the magnet. 
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+ + Magnetic flux 
Fig. 3.13: Horseshoe (yoke) electromagnet used for indirect magnetization 
Another way of indirectly inducting a magnetic field in a material is by using the 
magnetic field of a current carrying conductor. A circular magnetic field can be 
established in cylindrical components by using a central conductor. Typically, one or 
more cylindrical components are hung from a solid copper bar running through the inside 
diameter. Current is passed through the copper bar and the resulting circular magnetic 
field establishes a magnetic field within the test components. 
The use of coils and solenoids is a third method of indirect magnetization, Fig. 3.14. 
When the length of a component is several times larger than its diameter, a longitudinal 
magnetic field can be established in the component. The component is placed 
longitudinally in the concentrated magnetic field that fills the center of a coil or solenoid. 
This magnetization technique is often referred to as a "coil shot." 
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Field 
Current carrying coil 
Fig. 3.14: Coils and solenoids used for indirect magnetization 
3.2.4 Ultrasonic Inspection Technique 
3.2.4.1 Principles of Ultrasonic Inspection 
Ultrasonic Inspection (UI) uses high frequency sound energy to conduct examinations 
and make measurements. Ultrasonic inspection can be used for flaw detection/evaluation, 
dimensional measurements, material characterization, and more. A typical ultrasonic 
inspection system is a pulse/echo inspection. This system consists of several functional 
units, such as the pulser/receiver, transducer, and display devices. A pulser/receiver is an 
electronic device that can produce high voltage electrical pulses. Driven by the pulser, the 
transducer generates high frequency ultrasonic energy. The sound energy is introduced 
and propagate through the materials in the form of waves. When there is a discontinuity 
(such as a crack) in the wave path, part of the energy will be reflected back from the flaw 
surface. The reflected wave signal is tran formed into an electrical signal by the 
transducer and is displayed on a screen (Fig. 3.15). The reflected signal strength is 
displayed versus the time from signal generation to when an echo was received. Signal 
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travel time can be directly related to the distance that the signal traveled. From the signal, 
information about the reflector location, size, orientation and other features can be gained. 
Another ultrasonic inspection system is to measure changes in ultrasonic wave 
propagation speed, along with energy losses, from interactions with a material 
microstructure are often used to nondestructively gain information about a material's 
properties. Measurements of sound velocity and ultrasonic wave attenuation can be 
related to the elastic properties that can be used to characterize the texture of 
polycrystalline metals. 
Flaw Detector 
Fig. 3.15: Ultrasonic inspection technique (UI) 
3.2.4.2 Advantages of Ultrasonic Inspection 
Ultrasonic Inspection is a very useful and versatile NDI method. Some of the advantages 
of ultrasonic inspection that are often cited include: 
1. It is sensitive to both surface and subsurface discontinuities. 
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II. The depth of penetration for flaw detection or measurement is superior to other 
NDI methods. 
111. Only single-sided access is needed when the pulse-echo technique is used. 
IV. It is highly accurate m determining reflector position and estimating size and 
shape. 
v. Minimal part preparation is required. 
VI. Electronic equipment provides instantaneous results. 
Vll. Detailed images can be produced with automated systems. 
viii. It has other uses, such as thickness measurement, in addition to flaw detection. 
3.2.4.3 Disadvantages of Ultrasonic Inspection 
As with all NDI techniques, ultrasonic inspection also has its limitations, which include: 
1. Surface must be accessible to transmit ultrasound. 
11. Skill and training is more extensive than with some other techniques. 
111. Materials that are rough, irregular in shape, very small, exceptionally thin or not 
homogeneous are difficult to inspect. 
IV. Cast iron and other coarse grained materials are difficult to inspect due to low 
sound transmission and high signal noise. 
v. Linear flaws oriented parallel to the sound beam may go undetected. 
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vt. Reference standards are required for both equipment calibration and the 
characterization of flaws. 
3.2.5 Radiographic Inspection (RI) 
3.2.5.1 Principles of Radiographic Inspection 
X-rays are used to produce images of objects using film or other detector that is sensitive 
to radiation. The test object IS placed between the radiation source and detector. The 
thickness and the density of the material that X-rays must penetrate affect the amount of 
radiation reaching the detector. This variation m radiation produces an image on the 
detector that often shows internal features of the test object (Fig. 3.16). 
Radiation 
J/1~ 
~ Flaw 
··~ 
Radiographic film 
Radiographic film lop view 
Fig. 3.16: Radiographic Inspection (Rl) 
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3.2.5.2 Nature of Penetrating Radiation 
X-rays and gamma rays differ only in their source of origin. X-rays are produced by an 
x-ray generator and gamma radiation is the product of radioactive atoms. They are 
waveforms, as are light rays, microwaves, and radio waves . X-rays and gamma rays 
cannot be seen, felt, or heard. They pos ess no charge and no mass and, therefore, are not 
influenced by electrical and magnetic fields and will generally travel in straight lines. 
However, they can be diffracted (bent) in a manner similar to light. 
Both X-rays and gamma rays can be characterized by frequency, wavelength, and 
velocity. However, they act somewhat like a pruticle at times in that they occur as small 
"packets" of energy and are referred to as "photons". Due to their short wavelength they 
have more energy to pass through matter than do the other forms of energy in the 
electromagnetic spectrum. As they pass through matter, they are scattered and absorbed 
and the degree of penetration depends on the kind of matter and the energy of the rays. 
3.2.5.3 Main Uses of RI 
Used to inspect almost any material for surface and subsurface flaws. X-rays can also be 
used to locate and measure internal features , confirm the location of hidden parts in an 
assembly, and to measure thickness of materials. 
3.2.5.4 Main Advantages of RI 
1. Can be used to inspect virtually all materials. 
11. Detects surface and subsurface flaws. 
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m. Ability to inspect complex shapes and multi-layered structures without 
disassembly. 
IV. Minimum part preparation is required. 
3.2.5.5 Disadvantages of RI 
1. Extensive operator training and skill required. 
II. Access to both sides of the structure is usually required. 
111. Orientation of the radiation beam to non-volumetric flaws is critical. 
IV. Field inspection of thick section can be time consuming. 
v. Relatively expensive equipment investment is required. 
vi. Possible radiation hazard for personnel. 
3.2.5.6 Real-time Radiography 
Real-time radiography (RTR), or real-time radioscopy, is a nondestructive inspection 
(NDI) method whereby an image is produced electronically, rather than on film, so that 
very little lag time occurs between the item being exposed to radiation and the resulting 
image. In most instances, the electronic image that is viewed results from the radiation 
passing through the object being inspected and interacting with a screen of material that 
fluoresces or gives off light when the interaction occurs. The fluorescent elements of the 
screen form the image much as the grains of silver form the image in film radiography. 
The image formed is a "positive image" since brighter areas on the image indicate where 
higher levels of transmitted radiation reached the screen. This image is the opposite of the 
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negative tmage produced in film radiography. In other words, with RTR, the lighter, 
brighter areas represent thinner sections or less dense sections of the inspected object. 
3.2.5. 7 Future Direction of Radiographic Inspection 
Radiographers of the future will capture images in digitized form and e-mail them to the 
customer when the inspection has been completed. Film evaluation will likely be left to 
computers. Inspectors may capture a digitized image, feed them into a computer and wait 
for a printout of the image with an accept/reject report. Systems will be able to scan a prut 
and present a three-dimensional image to the radiographer, helping in locating the flaw 
within the part. 
3.2.6 Eddy Current Inspection (ECI) 
3.2.6.1 Principles of Eddy Current Inspection 
Alternating electrical cun·ent is passed through a coil producing a magnetic field (Fig. 
3.17). When the coil is placed near a conductive material, the changing magnetic field 
induces current flow in the material. These currents travel in closed loops and are called 
eddy cuiTents. Eddy currents produce their own magnetic field that can be measured and 
used to find flaws and characterize conductivity, permeability, and dimensional features. 
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Coil 
Eddy current 
Coil's magnetic field 
Eddy current 
magnetic field 
Fig. 3.17: Eddy current inspection 
3.2.6.2 Main Uses of ECI 
Used to detect surface and near-surface flaws in conductive materials, such as the metals. 
Eddy current inspection is also used to sort materials based on electrical conductivity and 
magnetic permeability, and measmes the thickness of thin sheets of metal and 
nonconductive coatings such as paint. 
3.2.6.3 Main Advantages of ECI 
1. Detects surface and near surface flaws. 
11. Test probe does not need to contact the part. 
111. Method can be used for more than flaw detection. 
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1v. Minimum part preparation is required. 
3.2.6.3 Disadvantages of ECI 
1. Only conductive materials can be inspected. 
u. Ferromagnetic materials require special treatment to address magnetic 
permeability. 
m. Depth of penetration is limited. 
1v. Flaws that lie parallel to the inspection probe coil winding direction can go 
undetected. 
v. Skill and training required is more extensive than other techniques. 
v1. Surface finish and roughness may interfere. 
vu. Reference standards are needed for setup. 
3.2.7 Acoustic Emission Inspection Technique (AEI) 
3.2.7.1 Principle and Sources of AE 
The AEI technique is illustrated in Fig. 3.18, It begins with forces acting on a body; the 
resulting stress is the stimulus (change in pressure, load, or temperature) that causes 
deformation and with it, acoustic emission (elastic wave that travels outward from the 
source, moving through the body). This wave arrives at a remote sensor. In response, the 
sensor produces an electrical signal, which is passed to electronic equipment for further 
processing. 
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Signal 
+--- ~,J/ ---+ </) +--- Acoustic ---+ en "' <!) q l:l Emission ('I> 
C/) +--- Wave ---+ ~ /~~ +--- ---+ 
Fig. 3.18: Acoustic Emission Inspection Technique (AEI) 
AE's originate with stress. When a stress is exerted on a material, a strain is induced in 
the material as well. The most detectible acoustic emissions take place when a loaded 
material undergoes plastic deformation or when a material is loaded at or near its yield 
stress. On the microscopic level, as plastic deformation occurs, atomic planes slip past 
each other through the movement of dislocations. These atomic-scale deformations 
release energy in the form of elastic waves which "can be thought of as naturally 
generated ultrasound" traveling through the object. When cracks exi t in a metal, the 
stress levels present in front of the crack tip can be several times higher than the 
surrounding area. Therefore, AE activity will also be observed when the material ahead of 
the crack tip undergoes plastic deformation (micro-yielding). 
Two sources of fatigue cracks also cause AE's. The first source is emissive particles (e.g. 
nonmetallic inclusions) at the origin of the crack tip. Since these particles are less ductile 
than the surrounding material, they tend to break more easily when the metal is strained, 
resulting in an AE signal. The second source is the propagation of the crack tip that 
occurs through the movement of dislocations and small-scale cleavage produced by 
triaxial stresses. 
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The amount of energy released by an acoustic emissiOn and the amplitude of the 
waveform are related to the magnitude and velocity of the source event. The amplitude of 
the emission is proportional to the velocity of crack propagation and the amount of 
surface area created. Large, discrete crack jumps will produce larger AE signals than 
cracks that propagate slowly over the same distance. 
Detection and conversion of these elastic waves to electrical signals is the basis of AE 
inspection. Analysis of these signals yield valuable information regarding the origin and 
importance of a discontinuity in a material. 
Sources of AE vary from natural events like earthquakes and rockbursts to the initiation 
and growth of cracks, slip and dislocation movements, melting, twinning, and phase 
transformations in metals. 
Acoustic Emission is unlike most other nonde tructive testing (NDT) techniques in two 
regards. The first difference pertains to the origin of the signal. Instead of supplying 
energy to the object under examination, AEI simply listens for the energy released by the 
object. AE inspection is often performed on structures while in operation, as this provides 
adequate loading for propagating flaws and triggering acoustic emissions. 
The second difference is that AEI deals with dynamic processes, or changes, in a 
material. This is particularly meaningful because only active features (e.g. crack growth) 
are highlighted. The ability to discern between developing and stagnant flaws is 
significant. However, it is possible for flaws to go undetected altogether if the loading is 
not high enough to cause an acoustic event. Furthermore, AE Inspection usually provides 
an immediate indication relating to the strength or risk of failure of a component. Other 
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advantages of AET include fast and complete volumetric inspection using multiple 
sensors, permanent sensor mounting for process control, and no need to disassemble and 
clean a specimen. 
Unfortunately, AE systems can only qualitatively gauge how much damage is contained 
in a structure. In order to obtain quantitative results about size, depth, and overall 
acceptability of a part, other NDT methods (often ultrasonic Inspection) are necessary. 
Another drawback of AE stems from loud service environments which contribute 
extraneous noise to the signals. For successful applications, signal discrimination and 
noise reduction are crucial. AE can be subjected to extraneous noise. Noise in AE 
inspection refers to any undesirable signals detected by the sensors. Examples of these 
signals include frictional sources (e.g. loose bolts or movable connectors that shift when 
exposed to wind loads) and impact sources (e.g. rain, flying objects or wind-driven dust) 
in bridges. Sources of noise may also be present in applications where the area being 
inspected may be disturbed by mechanical vibrations (e.g. pumps). 
To compensate for the effects of background noise, various procedures can be 
implemented. Some possible approaches involve fabricating special sensors with 
electronic gates for noise blocking, taking precautions to place sensors as far away as 
possible from noise sources, and electronic filtering. 
3.2.7.2 AEI Applications 
Detection and analysis of AE signals can supply valuable information regarding the origin 
and importance of a discontinuity in a material. Because of the versatility of acoustic 
emission inspection (AEI), it has many industrial applications (e.g. assessing structural 
67 
integrity, crack growth due to hydrogen embrittlement, fatigue, stress corrosion, creep, 
flaws detection, testing for leaks, monitoring weld quality, on-line monitoring of 
components and systems). 
3.2.8 Thermal Inspection Technique 
It is also referred as Thermography, Thermal Imaging, Thermal Wave Imaging and 
Infrared (IR) Inspection. Thermal NDI technique involves the measurement or mapping 
of surface temperatures as heat flows to, from and/or through an object. The simplest 
thermal measurements involve making point measurements with a thermocouple. This 
type of measurement might be useful in locating hot spots, such as a bearing that is 
wearing out and starting to heat up due to an increase in friction or locating hot spots in 
fired heater casing due to damage in the refractory. 
In its more advanced form, the use of thermal imaging systems allow thermal information 
to be very rapidly collected over a wide area and in a non-contact mode. Thermal imaging 
systems are instruments that create pictures of heat flow rather than of light. Thermal 
imaging is a fast, cost effective way to perform detailed thermal analysis. 
The basic premi e of thermographic NDI is that the flow of heat from the surface of a 
solid is affected by internal flaws such as voids or inclusions. 
3.2.8.1 Principles of Thermal Inspection 
Thermal energy transfer occurs through three mechanisms: conduction, convection, 
and/or radiation. Conduction occurs primarily in solids and to a lesser degree in fluids as 
warmer, more energetic molecules transfer their energy to cooler adjacent molecules. 
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Convection occurs in liquids and gases, and involves the mass movement of molecules 
such as when stirring or mixing is involved. 
The third way that heat is transferred is through electromagnetic radiation of energy. 
Radiation needs no medium to flow through and, therefore, can occur even in a vacuum. 
Electromagnetic radiation is produced when electrons lose energy and fall to a lower 
energy state. Both the wavelength and intensity of the radiation is directly related to the 
temperature of the surface molecules or atoms. 
The wavelength of thermal radiation extends from 0.1 microns to several hundred 
microns. Not all of the heat radiated from an object will be visible to the human eye, but 
the heat is detectable. Consider the gradual heating of a piece of steel. With the 
application of a heat source, heat radiating from the part is felt long before a change in 
color is noticed. If the heat intensity is great enough and applied for long enough, the part 
will gradually change to a red color. The heat that is felt prior to the part changing color is 
the radiation that lies in the infrared frequency spectmm of electromagnetic radiation. 
Infrared (IR) radiation has a wavelength that is longer than visible light or (greater than 
700 nanometers). As the wavelength of the radiation shortens, it reaches the point where 
it is short enough to enter and be visible with the human eye. 
Some thermal imaging techniques simply involve pointing a camera at a component and 
looking at areas of uneven heating or localized hot spots. For some other applications, it 
may be necessary to generate heat flow within the component and/or evaluate heat flow 
as a function of time. 
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An infrared camera has the ability to detect and display infrared energy. The basis for 
infrared imaging technology is that any object whose temperature is above 0°K radiates 
infrared energy. 
3.2.8.2 Applications of Thermal Imaging 
1. Electrical and Mechanical System Inspection 
Electrical and mechanical systems are the backbone of many manufacturing 
operations. An unexpected shutdown of even a minor piece of equipment could 
have a major impact on production. Since nearly everything gets hot before it 
fails, thermal inspection is a valuable and cost-effective diagnostic tool with many 
industrial applications. With the infrared camera, an inspector can see the change 
in temperature from the surrounding area, identify whether or not it is abnormal 
and predict the possible failure. Applications for infrared testing include locating 
loose electrical connections, failing transformers, improper bushing and bearing 
lubrication, overloaded motors or pumps, coupling misalignment, and other 
applications where a change in temperature will indicate an undesirable condition. 
11. Corrosion Damage (Metal Thinning) 
IR techniques can be used to detect material thinning of relatively thin structures 
since areas with different thermal masses will absorb and radiate heat at different 
rates. In relatively thin, thermally conductive materials, heat will be conducted 
away from the surface faster by thicker regions. By heating the surface and 
monitoring its cooling characteristics, a thickness map can be produced (Fig. 
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3.19). Thin areas may be the re ult of corrosion damage on the backside of a 
structure which is normally not visible. 
Fig. 3.19: Metal thinning detection using IR inspection technique 
111. Flaw Detection 
Infrared techniques can be used to detect flaws in materials or structures. The 
inspection technique monitors the flow of heat from the surface of a solid and this 
flow is affected by internal flaws such as voids or inclusions. Sound material, a 
good weld, or a solid bond will see heat dissipate rapidly through the material, 
whereas a flaw will retain the heat for longer. The inspected component can be 
directly heated or alternatively excited (using vibrothermograph or thermosonic) 
with bur t of high-energy, low-frequency acoustic energy. Thi causes frictional 
heating at the face of any cracks present and hotspots are detected by an infrared 
camera, Fig. (3.20). 
71 
Fig. 3.20: Flaw detection using IR inspection technique 
tv. Stress concentration detection 
Stress concentration or areas of high fatigue show up as hot spots in IR scans 
because the higher temperature or the stressed areas. 
3.2.8.3 Main Advantages of Thermal Inspection 
1. Fast data acquisition 
ii. Minimal surface preparation 
111. No contact needed and works good in complex geometry to avoid high cost of 
disassembly 
tv. Portable 
3.2.8.4 Main Disadvantages of Thermal Inspection 
1. High first cost 
ii. Structures to be fatigued or heated for thermal activity 
iii. Only surface stress is obtainable not internal stress 
72 
3.3 Buried Pipeline Inspection 
Engineers have developed devices, called pigs, that are sent through the buried pipe to 
perform inspections and clean the pipe. The pigs are carried through the pipe by the flow 
of the liquid or gas and can travel and perform inspections over very large distances. They 
may be put into the pipe line on one end and taken out at the other. The pigs carry a small 
computer to collect, store and transmit the data for analysis. In 1997, a pig set a world 
record when it completed a continuous inspection of the Trans Ala ka crude oil pipeline, 
covering a distance of 1,055 km in one run. 
Pigs use several nondestructive testing methods to perform the inspections. Most pigs use 
a magnetic flux leakage method but some also use ultrasound to perform the inspections. 
For example, the pig shown in Fig. 3.21 uses magnetic flux leakage. 
Drive package Magnetic flux Recorder package 
Fig. 3.21: A pig uses magnetic flux leakage technique for buried pipe line inspection 
On some pipelines it is easier to use remote visual inspection equipment to assess the 
condition of the pipe. Robotic crawlers of all shapes and sizes have been developed to 
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navigate the pipe. The video signal i typically fed to a truck where an operator review 
the images and controls the robot. 
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Chapter 4 
Crack Growth Assessment 
S ubcritical crack growth can occur prior to reaching the critical crack size. This can 
occur due to fatigue, corrosion, creep or combination between two or more of these 
degradation mechanisms (e.g., corrosion fatigue, creep-fatigue interaction). 
The ability of the NDI technique to detect a crack is a function of the crack size and 
therefore asses ment of the crack size is required when electing an optimal NDI 
technique. 
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4.1 Fatigue Cracking 
4.1.1 Fatigue Crack Growth Rate 
Fatigue crack growth can be modeled using the well known Paris Law (1963) which 
relates crack growth to the number of stress cycles as follows: 
da = C.(l1k)"' 
dN 
(4.1) 
Where a is the crack size, N is the number of stress cycles, C and m are material constants 
for fatigue crack growth and /1k is the stress intensity range factor which, in general, can 
be calculated as follows: 
!1k = F(a).I1CY.~ (4.2) 
Where /1cr is the applied stress range and F(a) is the geometry function. 
In logarithmic coordinates, the Paris equation is represented by the straight line (AB) as 
shown in Fig 4.1 . 
In practical applications, the linear relationship between (lndaldN) and (ln/1k) could be 
extrapolated up to the threshold stress intensity range, 11kth (point C) while 11kth is the 
stress intensity range at which the crack begins to propagate. This extrapolation will give 
overestimate to the crack growth rate in the vicinity of 11kth (portion AC). The critical 
stress intensity range 11kcr is smaller than the fracture toughness 11kr and located on the 
straight line AB. 
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In dafdN 
In Ak 
Fig. 4.1: Typical fatigue crack growth 
An integral form of Paris Law is given by 
(4.3) 
Where ao is the initial crack size; aN is crack size after N stress cycles. The geometry 
function, F(a), for a specific fatigue component may be obtained from the available stress 
intensity manuals or derived using fracture mechanics principles. 
The geometry function depends on the geometry of the body (e.g., plate, pipe), location of 
the crack (e.g., edge, center, distributed) and loading (e.g., normal load, bending). 
Analytical integration of Paris Law is not possible in most applications since the 
geometry functions are not mathematically simple. For simplicity consider the case of a 
loaded plate where F(a) does not much change within the range ao to critical size, acr, a 
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weighted average geometry function, Fav = [F(a0 ) + F(acr)]/2 may be used [Ragab and 
Bayoumi (1999)]; hence integration of Paris Law yields: 
Form= 2: 
Form f:: 2: 
m m ( 1-) ( 1- -) 
acr 2 - ao 2 N ,.r = __ ___:_: __ ..:::...._ _ _ 
Ill 
C.[Fav ]"' n 2 . (~o-)111[1 - m] 
2 
Where Ncr is the critical number of stress cycles and acr is the critical crack size. 
(4.4) 
(4.5) 
Ncr= f. tcr where f is frequency of loading (e.g. 500,000 cycle/year) and tcr is the critical 
time to failure. 
Harris (1992) provides a review of probabilistic fracture mechanics and gives examples 
from reported literatures for fatigue crack growth for some materials (e.g., Inconell 718 at 
70° F in hydrogen, In co nell 718 at 70° F in air, 21 I 4 Cr-1 Mo steel at 1000° F). This review 
shows that Paris equation gives a good fit to fatigue crack growth rate for 21 I 4 Cr-1 Mo 
steel at 1000° Fin air, with m = 2.87 and C = 6.607x10-10 (da/dN in inches per cycle and 
~K in ksi-in 112). 
Flaws detected by the pre-service and in-service inspections may be planar or volumetric 
and located on surface or subsurface. ASME Boiler and pressure vessels code, section XI, 
provides the rules for approximating the initial crack size, ao, based on flaw shape, 
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proximity to closest flaw, flaw orientation, and flaw location, which are used m the 
analytical model for linear elastic fracture mechanics. 
Theses volumetric flaws and planar flaws may initiate cracks after number of stress 
cycles. As a conservative procedure volumetric flaws and planar flaws can be considered 
as cracks with initial size as the initial size of theses flaws [ASME, section XI] neglecting 
the time for initiating a fatigue crack from a flaw in comparison with fatigue life. 
In practical engineering applications, surface and embedded cracks usually have an 
irregular shape. 8.k depends on crack size as well as crack shape. Crack shape can have a 
significant influence on crack growth rates and accumulated crack growth. In principal, 
changes in crack shape as well as crack size could be tracked by predicting the 
incremental crack growth at various locations along the crack front. However, such an 
approach is time-consuming and impractical. Usually, an embedded flaw is characterized 
as an elliptic crack, and crack growth is only predicted along the major and minor axes of 
the idealized flaw. Similarly, a surface flaw is characterized as a semi-elliptic crack, and 
growth is only predicted at the deepest point and surface [ASME, section XI]. 
4.1.2 Effective Stress Range 
To account for the variable amplitude stress ranges that result from random stress range, 
~cr, can be replaced by an effective con tant stress range, ~crerr, which represents a 
weighted effect of stress ranges of all amplitudes and produces the same crack growth 
rate. 
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Schilling et a!. (1978) proposed the u e of the root mean cube (RMC) of the collected 
stress range spectmm in a component as the effective stress range, ~<Jeff, for fatigue 
evaluation: 
1 
~a eff = [L;~I R; .(~a; )3 r (4.6) 
Where Ri = ratio of the number of cycle with ith stress range amplitude, ~cri, to the total 
number of cycle (a total of n ranges are con idered). 
Another method for calculating ~<Jeff i to use the following equation [Ship Stmcture 
Committee, SSC (1997)]: 
(4.7) 
Where m is material exponent for crack growth rate. 
Some studies have shown that the tress range, ~cr. spectrum may be modeled by 
Rayleigh distribution [Schilling et al. (19780] or Weibull distribution [Cramer et al. 
(1995)]. Rayleigh distribution is usually applied to define nanow banded stress spectrum 
and Weibull distribution is usually applied to define long banded stress pectrum. For 
Rayleigh di tribution, the effective stress range, ~<Jeff, can be expressed in term of 
gamma function, f( ), [Chung et al. (2006)] a follows: 
I 
~aeff = { E[~am]} m (4.8) 
(4.9) 
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Where b is parameter of Rayleigh distribution, E[~crm] is mean of ~crm. 
For Weibull di tribution, E[~crm] can be calculated as follows [Cramer et al. (1992)]: 
E[~a-~~~] =em .r(l + m) 
fJ 
Where 8 and~ are scale and shape parameter of Weibull distribution respectively. 
(4.10) 
Equations 4.8 and 4.10 lead to the effective stress for Weibull distribution as follows: 
I I 
- m -~a-eff •Weibull = {E[~a-"'] }111 = Br(l + -) 111 
fJ 
(4.11) 
The Rayleigh distribution is a special case of the Weibull distribution where Rayleigh 
distribution with parameter b is equivalent to the Weibull distribution with parameters 
e =..fi.b and~= 2. 
4.2 Crack Growth Due to Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) 
Crack growth due to SCC is a function of the material condition, environment, the stress 
intensity factor due to sustained loading, and the total time that the flaw is exposed to the 
environment under sustained loading. ASME code, section XI gives procedure for 
computing sec crack growth based on experimental data relating the flaw growth rate 
(da/dt) to the sustained load stress intensity factor K. The procedure used for determining 
the cumulative crack growth is as follows [ASME code, section XI] 
(1) Determine the stress intensity factor K for a given steady tate stress condition. 
(2) Calculate the incremental growth of the crack size corresponding to the period for 
which the steady state stress is applied. This can be obtained from the relation hip 
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between da/dt and K. A sufficiently small time interval hall be selected to ensure 
that the crack size and the associated K value do not change significantly during 
this interval. 
(3) Update the crack size. 
(4) Continue the crack growth analysis for the period during which the stress exi t 
until the end of the evaluation period. 
The above procedure yields the final crack size at the end of the evaluation period, 
considering sec crack growth alone. 
The crack growth rate for alloy 600 in primary water reactor (PWR) environments can be 
given by the following equation [ASME code, section XI]: 
da = exp[- Qx (_!_ __ l J]a(K 
dt R T ~ef 
_ K VJ , K>Kth 
th J 
(4. 12) 
Where 
da/dt = crack growth rate at temperature T in rnls 
Qg = thermal activation energy for crack growth = 130 kJ/mole 
R =universal gas constant= 8.314 X 10-3 kJ/mole °K 
T = absolute operating temperature at location of crack, °K 
Tref = absolute reference temperature used to normalize data= 598.15 °K 
a = crack growth rate coefficient = 2.67 x 10- 12 at 325°C for da/dt in units of rnls and K 
in units of MPa .m 112 
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K k . . . f MP 112 = crac tip stress mtenstty actor, a .m 
K1h =crack tip stress intensity factor threshold for SCC = 9 MPa .m112 
~=exponent= 1.16 
When K is less than or equal to Kth and daldt = 0. 
White, et. al, (2005) reported the results of work sponsored by the Electric Power 
Research Institute (EPRI) Materials Reliability Program (MRP) to develop crack growth 
rate curves for primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) of alloy 82, 182 and 
132 weld metal at different temperatures, conservatively assuming no stress intensity 
factor threshold for PWSCC (i.e., K1h = 0 ). The general form of MRP equation is a 
follows: 
da _ [ Qg [ 1 1 Jl p 
- - exp - - - - - a.falloy ·forienr K 
dt R T Tref (4. 13) 
Where: 
daldt, Qg, R, T, Trer and K are as defined in the ASME-Section XI equation 
a= power-law constant 
= 1.5 x 10- 12 at 325°C for daldt in units of m/s and Kin units of MPa .m112 
! alloy = 1.0 for Alloy 182 or 132 and 11206=0.385 for Alloy 82 
f orienr = 1.0 except 0.5 for crack propagation that is clearly perpendicular to the dendrite 
solidification direction 
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~=exponent 
= 1.6 
The form of the MRP equation at 325°C is a follows: 
For Alloy 182 and 132: 
da = l.Sxlo-12 Kl.6 
dt 
For Alloy 82: 
da = (l.Sxl0-12 I 2.6).K l.6 
dt 
4.3 Crack Growth Due to a Combination of Fatigue and SCC 
(4.14) 
(4.15) 
When the service loading and environmental conditions are such that the crack is 
subjected to both fatigue and sec growth, the final crack size are obtained by adding the 
increments in crack size due to fatigue and SCC [ASME, Section XI] . 
In a real application, a better fit to crack growth data generated under simulated operating 
conditions and environments would be needed. 
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Chapter 5 
Optimization Model 
T his chapter proposes a new methodology for selecting an optimal non-destructive 
inspection technique and its associated optimum inspection interval for welded 
component. 
5.1 Reliability of the NDI Techniques 
The most common NDI techniques are the ultrasonic inspection (UI), the magnetic 
particle inspection (MI), the penetrant inspection (PI), the radiographic inspection (RI), 
the eddy current inspection (ECI), and the visual inspection (VI). Two main parameters 
are used to quantify the reliability of NDI techniques. These are the Probability of 
Detection function (POD) and the Probability of False Calls, (PFC). 
The POD function is a measure of the ability of the technique to detect an existing flaw. It 
is a function of the flaw size, a. The following procedure can be followed to determine an 
estimate for the POD function for a specific NDI technique. First, a number of flaws with 
various sizes are either artificially introduced in a number of test specimens or are 
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existing as a pre-service flaws or in-service flaws [Faher, et al. ( 1995)]. A specific NDI 
technique is used to detect these flaws. The ratio of the number of flaws detected to the 
number of the flaws actually existing is calculated. After the completion of the inspection 
of all samples, the samples are sectioned destructively to verify the presence of the flaws 
and to measure their sizes. The POD curve obtained is discrete. Each point is 
representative of a crack class range, and the probability of detection in that class is the 
number of actual detected cracks divided by the total number of actual cracks in that 
class. 
Berens and Hovey (1981) suggested using the log-odds or log-logistic model for 
expressing the POD function as follow : 
POD(a) = exp(a + ,B.lna) 
1 + exp(a + ,B.ln a) 
(5.1) 
Where a is the crack size in rnm, a and p are experimentally determined parameters. 
Staat (1993) suggested that POD can be formulated as follows: 
POD(a) = (1-p) (1-exp(-ca)) ; a~O (5.2) 
Where c is a parameter derived from experimental data and p IS the asymptotic non 
detection probability for large values of a (i.e. a - oo). Typical values for p are of the 
order of 0.01-0.05 for flaw sizes of practical interest. 
PFC is defined as the fraction of times that unflawed component will be incorrectly 
classified as being flawed. False calls could lead to costly repair that is actually not 
required as the flaw does not actually exist. 
86 
Heasler et al. ( 1993) proposed a model for POD function includes probability of false 
calls as follows: 
POD(a) = (l+exp(-(A+Ba))r' (5.3) 
From Eq. 5.3, by comparing the definitions of POD and PFC, it can be seen that PFC is 
the value of POD at flaw size a= 0. Hence PFC can be obtained as follows: 
PFC = POD(O) = (l+exp(-A)r' (5.4) 
Where A and Bare parameters regressed from experimental data. 
5.2 Condition of the Inspected Component 
Condition of the inspected component can be expressed by two parameters as follows: 
1. The critical time to failure (tcr) at which the growing fatigue crack reaches the 
critical size, acr· 
11. Probability of presence of a crack in the inspected component (H) which can be 
calculated as follows: 
Clj 
H = J fi( a) da 
0 
(5.5) 
Where Hi is probability of presence of a crack in the inspected asset at the time of 
the ith inspection 
ai and fi(a) are crack size and probability density function of the crack size, a, at 
time of the ith inspection, respectively. 
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5.3 The Proposed Optimization Model 
The crack size, a, is obtained as a function of the applied effective stress range (~crerr), 
stress frequency (f), the material parameters for fatigue crack growth (C and m) and 
the intial crack size, a0 • The critical time to failure (tcr) is obtained as a function of the 
effective stress range (~crerr), stress frequency (f), the critical ize (acr), the initial 
crack size (ao) and the material parameters for fatigue crack growth (C and m). The 
applied variable stress range (~cr) is replaced by a constant effective stre s range 
(~crerr) . The applied variable stress range (~cr), material parameters (C and m) and 
initial crack size, a0 are in general random variables. In order to consider all possible 
combinations of these random variables, Monte Carlo method is applied to simulate 
the crack growth rate in order to obtain the crack size (a), using Paris law [Paris and 
Erdogan (1963)], as a function of time (t) then POD of crack size at time of ith 
inspection, POD(ai), can be obtained from POD function (Eq. 5.1) and probability of 
presence of a crack in the inspected detail at time of the ith inspection (Hi) can be 
obtained from Eq. 5.5. 
The objective function, OF, is obtained for a given NDI technique as a function of 
reliability of the NDI technique (POD and PFC), condition of the inspected 
component (tcr and H) and the inspection interval (tint). The decision variables 
(controllable) are PFC, POD and tint· The objective function is subject to the afety 
constraint that probability of failure to detect a growing crack before reaching the 
critical size, E[Pr], does not exceed a predefined level, Pr,accept· 
The optimization problem can be summarized as follows: 
88 
Subject to: 
E[Pr]<Pr,acccpt 
By considering all the candidate NDI techniques, the minimum value of the objective 
function for each technique can be compared so as to finally lead to the optimal 
selection of NDI technique and associated inspection interval. The proposed 
optimization model is illustrated in the following flowchart, Fig 5.1. 
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J Select an inspection technique l l 
+ J Select an inspection interval, tint l -l 
~ 
J Generate random set of (a0 , C, m) I -l 
~ 
[ Calculate ~O"cff I 
Next ~ 
Simulation Plot the crack size, a, versus the time where: 
a= a(ao C, m, t, IY.cr,1f' f) 
~ 
/ 
Calculate the objective function, OF, at the selected inspection 
Nextt;" interval, tint, where: 
OF= OF(POD(a),PFC, H(a ), tc, (ao, ac,,C, m, cr •if' f) , tin.) 
~ 
Next For this inspection technique: 
teclmique 
1- Plot OF versus tint· 
2- Solve the optimization problem 
~ 
Compare the minimum OF for each inspection technique to obtain 
the optimum technique and the associated inspection interval. 
Fig. 5.1: Optimization Model Flowchart 
5.4 Simulation of the Crack Size as a Function of Time 
The crack growth rate depends on the variables (initial crack size, ao, crack growth 
parameter, C, crack growth exponent, m, and the stress range, IY.cr). Previous studies have 
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shown that a0 may be modeled by a Wiebull, Exponential or Lognormal distribution 
[Moan et al. (1997) and Thurlbeck et al. (1996)]. Crack growth parameter, C, and crack 
growth exponent, m, may be modeled using lognormal and normal distribution 
respectively [Tanaka et al. (1981)]. The stress range, ~cr. may be modeled using Rayliegh 
or Weibull distribution. By applying a sufficient number of simulations to the crack 
growth curve, all possible combinations of these random variables can be considered to 
take into account all possible crack growth rates. In each possible crack growth rate, the 
crack will reach its critical crack size at a time, tcr [i.e, acr = a(tcr)] . 
Time to failure, tcr. in a single simulation may be either longer or shorter than the time, t1, 
when the first inspection is performed [Chung et al. (2006)] as shown in Fig. 5.2 . 
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Fig. 5.2: Simulation of crack size as a function of time 
(A, one simulation and B, two simulations) 
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5.5 Crack Size Distribution 
The initial distribution of the sizes of existing cracks can be obtained from pre-service 
inspection. After putting the component into service, the cracks grow with time under 
fatigue. An approach suggested for estimating the mean, the standard deviation and the 
probability density function for the crack size at the inspection time is illustrated in Fig. 
5.3. 
Generate random set of the random variables (a,,. C, and m ) 
Plot crack size, a, versus time, t. 
Let this jth curve corresponding to jth simulation 
, j = 1,2,3, ..... ... 
Next simulation "j " 
For each simulation. Calculate crack size at time. t;, 
Where a.,~asa.,, and t; = t;.1 + t<.t , i = 1,2,3, .. .. 
(t<.t could be the minimum inspection interval "e.g., 0.5 year) 
Calculate mean and standard deviation of the cracks size obtained from 
all simulations at which a,,~a~a,, and estimate probability density 
function of crack size time t; 
Fig. 5.3: Distribution of crack size at the inspection time 
5.6 Possible Inspection Outcomes 
The inspected asset could have one of two states: crack or no crack. The inspection 
technique can produce a positive or negative result. The combinations of these four states 
can result in one of the following events: 
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Event E1: The asset is not cracked and the inspection result is negative. In this case no 
action needs to be taken. 
Event E2 : The asset has no crack and the inspection result is positive. This is a case of 
false call. An unnecessary repair action may be carried out which will lead to additional 
cost. 
Event E3: The asset is cracked but the inspection result is negative. This is a case of 
misdetection which can lead to failure if the crack is larger than the critical size. 
Event E4: The asset is cracked and the inspection result is positive. This is a case of good 
detection and a repair decision will be made in this case. 
The four possible inspection outcomes are indicated in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Possible outcomes from any inspection technique 
Inspection result 
Negative result Positive result 
Asset's state (no crack detected) (crack detected) 
No crack E1 Ez 
Crack exists E3 E4 
Let d = Event of detecting a crack and h = Event of a crack existing in the inspected area. 
The probability of detection (POD) is defined as the conditional probability that the 
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inspection technique will produce a positive result given that the asset has an existing 
crack. The probability of false calls (PFC), is defined as the conditional probability that 
the inspection technique will produce a positive result given that the asset does not have 
an existing crack. The probabilities POD and PFC can be expressed as: 
POD= p (d I h) 
PFC = p ( d I h ') 
Fig. 5.4 shows the event tree of the inspection outcomes. 
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P(E2) = (1-Hi).(PFC) 
P(E3) = (Hi).(l-PODi) 
P(E4) = (H).(PODi) 
(5.9) 
(5.10) 
(5.11) 
Where H=H(ai) and PODi=POD(ai) are the probabilities that the asset has an existing 
crack and probability of detection function at the ith inspection, respectively, where at ith 
inspection the crack size, a,= ai. 
5.7 Repair Probability 
When the result of an inspection is positive (events E2 and E4), an acceptance or repair 
decision of the detected crack will be made based on a comparison between the size of a 
detected crack and the maximum acceptable crack size, ar. A repair will be undertaken if 
the detected crack is not accepted. In case of event E2, the undertaken repair is false repair 
but in case of event E4, the undertaken repair is justifiable repair. 
Let Ai =probability of acceptance of crack with size ai at the ith inspection= P(ai<ar). 
From decision tree shown in Fig. 5.5, probability of justifiable repair at ith inspection, 
Pi(JR), can be estimated from the following equation: 
(5.12) 
The crack growth rate is simulated using Monte Carlo method, ai can be estimated at time 
of ith inspection for each simulation. Hence, in one simulation, Ai = 1 if ai:Sar and Ai = 0 
if ai>ar. 
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The inspection technique could give false calls greater or less than ar. To take that into 
account: 
Let the size of the flaw which is indicated by the inspection technique while actually the 
crack does not exist= ar (false calls as actually "a= 0"). 
Let F = P(ar >ar), where F can be estimated from the following equation .. 
a, 
F=l- J!(a1 )da1 (5.13) 
0 
f(a1 ) is probability density function of the cracks size indicated as false calls (incorrectly 
indicated by the inspection technique while actually no crack exists). From repair 
decision tree, probability of false repair at the ith inspection, Pi(FR), can be estimated as 
follows: 
Pi(FR) = P(E2).F = (1-H).(PFC). F (5.14) 
As a special case, in some critical applications, the repair policy dictates that repairs will 
be undertaken when the inspection result is positive indicating any crack size (i.e. the 
maximum acceptable crack size, ar = 0). In this special case: 
a =0 
F=P(a1 >a,)= P(a1 >0)=1 - 'JJ(a1 )da1 = 1 
0 
97 
(5.15) 
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Fig. 5.5: Repair Decision Tree 
5.8 Formulation of the Objective Function 
The optimization problem is to determine the decision variables (PFC, POD and 
inspection interval) giving the minimum value of the objective function (total co t) 
subject to the safety constraint that probability of failure as a result of nondetection a 
growing crack before reaching the critical size does not exceed a predefined level. 
Determination of the two decision variables (PFC and POD) means selection of the 
optimum NDI technique while determination of the third decision variable (inspection 
interval) means selection of the optimum inspection interval. 
The objective function, OF, may be defined as follow 
(5.9) 
Where 
, E[C1] = Expected cost of inspection over the lifetime. 
, E[CR] =Expected cost of repairs over the lifetime. 
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, E[Cr] =Expected cost of failure 
The expected cost of inspections during the lifetime of the asset, E[C1], can be estimated 
as follows: 
E[C1] = E[n] · K1 (5 .10) 
Where E[n] is the expected number of inspections over the lifetime prior to reaching the 
crack size to the critical size and K1 = Cost of one inspection. 
Consider a situation where n nondestructive inspections are performed on a component at 
a constant inspection interval, tint· The expected number of inspections during the lifetime 
of the inspected component can be estimated as follows [Chung et al. (2006)]: 
E[n] = E[nl tr ~tcr].P(tr gcr) + E[nl tr>tcr].P(tr>lcr) (5 .11) 
Where t 1 is time to the first inspection and tcr is critical time to failure. 
(5.12) 
Where N is total number of simulations and N 1 is number of simulations at which the first 
inspection time, t 1, is less than or equal the critical time and N2 is number of simulations 
at which the first inspection time is more than the critical time while, in this case, there 
will be no inspections and no repair decisions will be made. nj is number of inspections 
in simulation number "j". nj can be calculated a follows: 
99 
( 
tcr j ) n j = Integer - .-· 
t,nt (5.13) 
Where tcrj is the critical time (time to reaching the crack size to the critical size, acr) in jth 
simulation. 
E[n] can also be estimated as follows: 
N 
L>cr.j 
E[n] = Mean time to failure =-(_1_·=-=-'N.:.....__ ) 
Inspection interval 
The expected cost of failure, E[Cr], coiTesponding to event E3, can be estimated as 
follows: 
(5.14) 
E[Cr] = Kr · E[Pr] ; where Kr =Cost of failure and E[Pr] =Expected probability of failure 
to detect a growing crack before reaching the critical size. 
Expected probability of failure to detect a growing crack before fracture, E[Pr], can be 
estimated as follows: 
(5 .15) 
f[fi (1 - POD;).H;] 
= j = l i = t N, { ~) + (1{;) (5.16) 
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(5.17) 
PODi is probability of detection function obtained from equation 5.1 = POD(ai) where ai 
is the crack size at time of ith in pection (i.e, ai = a(ti) and ti = i . tint). 
The expected cost of repairs, E[CR], can be estimated as follows: 
(5.18) 
Where E[CFR] =Expected cost of false repairs corresponding to event E2 
and E(CJR) = Expected co t of justifiable repairs corresponding to event E4. 
E[CFR] can be estimated as follows: 
(5 .19) 
(5.20) 
N, "J 
I2)PFC.(l-H;)] 
(5.21) 
Hi is probability of presence a crack at inspection number i. 
E[C1R] can be estimated as follows: 
(5.22) 
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(5.23) 
N, n, I I[POD;.H;.(l - A; )] 
(5.24) 
Substitution in Eq. 5.9, leads to the objective function, OF, as follow : 
t.[ fj[{l -POD, ).H,)J + N2 
(5.25) 
N 
102 
Chapter 6 
Application of the Model 
6.1 Application 1: (Welding Joints of Ship Structures) 
A welding detail located in a side shell longitudinal-transverse frame connection of ship 
structure is considered in this application. This detail was presented by Cramer et al. 
( 1995) for the purpose of estimating the accumulated fatigue damage. The distribution of 
the stress range (mainly results in the waves) is modeled by Weibull distribution with 
shape parameter= 0.94 and scale parameter = 24.2 N/mm2 as was estimated by Cramer et 
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al. (1995). The same detail with the same stress distribution is considered here but for the 
purpose of establishing the optimum inspection plan. 
The initial flaw size, ao, is modeled as a lognormally distributed random variable with a 
mean value of 0.5 mm and a coefficient of variation (COY) of 0.5. The critical crack size, 
acr, is considered to be constant at 50 mm for this application. The fatigue crack growth 
parameter, C, is modeled as a lognormal variable with a mean value of 2.18x10-13 
assuming units of millimeters for crack size and MPa.m 112 for .0.k and a COY of 0.63 . 
The fatigue crack growth exponent, m, is modeled as a normally distributed random 
variable with a mean value of 3 and COY of 0.047. The considered welding detail is not 
in contact with the sea water, hence the value of C and mare taken to be consistent with 
their value in air not in marine environment. 
The repair policy dedicates the repair for any detected crack size (i.e. ar = 0). Average 
number of stress cycles is 500,000 cycle/year (the considered detail encounters 500,000 
waves in average per year and number of stress cycles is one cycle per one wave). The 
geometry function F(a) is taken unity for simplicity in this application. In this case 
equations ( 4.4) and ( 4.5) can be applied for calculating the critical number of cycles and 
therefore the critical time to failure "tcr". 
Three NDI techniques are considered in this application, Ultrasonic inspection (UI), 
Magnetic Particle Inspection (MI) and Liquid Penetrant Inspection (PI). The POD 
functions for the three NDI techniques based on data obtained from test results of a flat 
plate collected by Berens and Hovey (1981) are shown in Fig 6.1 and Table 6.1. 
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Fig 6.1: POD curves for Penetrant, PI, Magnetic, MI, and Ultrasonic, UI, inspections. 
Table 6.1: Probability of detection obtained by Berens and Hovey (1981 ). 
POD(a) = exp(a + f3.1na) 
I + exp(a + f3.1na ) 
NDI technique a ~ 
UI -0.119 2.986 
MI 0.466 0.604 
PI -0.561 0.393 
The relative cost of inspection (K1) for each inspection technique, cost of repair, KR, and 
cost of failure, KF is taken as: 
Kl,PI : KI,Ml: Kl,Ul :KR: KF = 1 1.2 : 1.5 : 2 : 20000 $ 
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PFC for each inspection technique is taken as the average of the results obtained from a 
study was done for POD and PFC assessment of NDI techniques by Faher, eta!. (1995) as 
follows: 
PFCu1 = 1.4%, PFCM1 = 5% and PFCp1 = 1% 
The applied stress intensity factor, .6-k, is conservatively assumed to be greater than the 
threshold stress intensity range, .6-k,h, in all the stress cycles. 
By applying the proposed model (Fig. 5.1), the obtained results are shown in Table 6.2, 
Table 6.3 and Table 6.4. 
Table 6.2: Results obtained for UI technique (K,,P,:K,,M,:K,.u,:KR:KF 
= 1:1.2:1.5:2:20000 $) 
Inspection interval (year) 
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
OF 937.97 470.80 325.03 264.59 246.2 1 256.40 284.49 3 17.23 370.91 437.42 
E[Pr] 0 0.0002 0.0007 0.0016 0.0030 0.0051 0.0076 0.0101 0.0134 0.0173 
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Table 6.3: Results obtained for MI technique (KI.PI:KI.MI:KI,UI:KR:KF 
= 1:1.2:1.5:2:20000 $) 
Inspection interval (year) 
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
OF 893.30 454.07 324.07 285.26 289.53 319.80 369.34 441.15 515.57 616.62 
E[Pr] 0.0001 0.0005 0.0014 0.0032 0.0056 0.0087 0.0122 0.0166 0.0209 0.0265 
Table 6.4: Results obtained for PI technique (KI,PI:KI,MI:KI,ui:KR:KF 
= 1:1.2:1.5:2:20000 $) 
Inspection interval (year) 
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4 .5 5 
OF 604.7 341.9 3 12.6 362.9 446.1 569.2 706.2 85 1.8 1013.2 11 80.8 
E[Pr] 0.0003 0.0022 0.0057 0.0107 0.0164 0.0236 0.0311 0.0389 0.0474 0.0561 
The obtained results are shown in the following figures: 
Fig. 6.2 shows the cost of inspection and cost of repair (false repairs and justifiable 
repairs) versus different inspection intervals for the three inspection techniques. 
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Fig. 6.2: Cost versus different inspection intervals 
5 
Figs. 6.3 and 6.4 show the expected probability of failure to detect a growing crack before 
reaching the critical size, E[Pr], and the expected cost of failure, El Cr], versus different 
inspection interval . 
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Fig. 6.3 : Probability of failure to detect a growing crack before reaching the critical size 
versus different in pection intervals 
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Fig. 6.5: Objective function versus different inspection intervals 
Mean of the critical time to failure, tcr,mean. obtained from all the simulation of the crack 
size as a function of time is obtained as 79.3 years. 
From Fig. 6.5, the minimum value of the objective function and the associated inspection 
interval can be obtained for the three inspection technique as it is indicated in Table 6.5. 
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Table 6.5: Summary of the results 
K1P1: K1M1 :K1u1: KR: KF= 1: 1.2: 1.5:2:20000$ 
. . . 
Inspection Expected number of Optimum inspection 
technique Minimum value of the 
in pections during the 
interval in service years 
objective function lifetime 
tint,opt 
E[n] = tcr.mea,/ tint.opt 
UI 246.2 2.5 31.72 
MI 285.3 2 39.65 
PI 312.6 1.5 52.87 
From Table 6.5, the optimum selection of NDI technique for this application is ultrasonic 
inspection "Ul" with inspection interval 2.5 years. It should be noted that probability of 
failure for UI at inspection interval, 2.5 years, is less than the maximum acceptable limit 
(Pr,accept = 0.005), Fig. 6.5. 
6.2 Application 2 (Welding Joints of Subsea Pipelines) 
A welding joint located in 22" OD (thickness = 12.9 mm) sub-sea gas pipeline is 
considered in this application. Sub-sea pipelines are laid out on the seabed. As a result of 
the irregular contour of seabed surfaces, there are some parts of sub-sea pipelines are 
suspended and not supported by seabed soil. These suspended parts are called free spans 
(Fig. 6.6). Pipe in free span length is subjected to static stresses and dynamic stresses. The 
11 2 
static stresses are due to pipeline weight in the free span, operating temperature and 
pressure. The dynamic stresses are due to environmental loading caused by wave loads 
and/or vortex induced vibrations. The vortex induced vibrations (VIV) are caused as a 
result of the unstable vortices formed at the opposite side of the underwater current 
direction (Fig. 6.7). The free span of the considered pipe line is 40 meters and beyond 500 
meters distance from the platform. 
Sea water 
' Pipeline 
Supporting soil 
Free span 
Fig. 6.6: Free span of sub-sea pipeline 
Cross flow 
Fig. 6.7: Vortex induced vibrations of a pipe under a cross flow 
113 
The fatigue in the free span is caused by the variations m the stresses due to 
environmental loading. Two empirical models can be used for analysis of the case of in-
lme fatigue caused by direct waves induced loads or by vortex induced vibrations. The 
response model is relevant for current dominant conditions while the force model based 
on Morison's equation is applicable in wave dominant conditions. The effect of waves is 
significant even through the water depth is 70-80 meters [Tronsker et at. (2002)]. 
The distribution of the stress range (~cr) in the free span of subsea pipelines due to vortex 
induced vibrations can be modeled by Weibull distribution [Tronsker et al. (2002)] 
assuming that the welding joint is located at the middle of the free-span at 3 and 9 o' clock 
position (i.e at position of the maximum applied stresses). The welding joint is the critical 
point in the pipeline due to welding flaws and stress concentration so it should be 
inspected at regular intervals to ensure the safety of the pipe line for which we are seeking 
for the optimum selection of the NDI technique and its associated optimum inspection 
interval. 
The cumulative probability density function of Weibull distribution for the stress range 
(~cr) is: 
F(M) = 1- exp[ - ( ~: n (6.1) 
The two parameters (8 and~) of the stress range (~cr) Weibull distribution due to VIV are 
dependent on the diameter of the pipe line and free span length as follows [Tronsker et al. 
(2002)]. 
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22"0D: 
Span length 
40m 
45 m 
50m 
14" OD: 
Span length 
22.5 m 
25m 
27.5 m 
30m 
e 
4.9 MPa 
11.5 MPa 
13.4 MPa 
e 
1.15 MPa 
2.24 MPa 
2.98 MPa 
5.68 MPa 
0.8 
1.2 
1.5 
p 
0.84 
0.74 
0.76 
0.98 
#Stress cycles/year 
3.6x105 
2x106 
2.4x106 
#Stress cycles/year 
0.59x101 
1.2x 104 
4.5x105 
2.3 x106 
Tronsker et a!. (2002) found that, for the considered 22" pipeline, free-span survey should 
be performed with intervals not exceeding 3 years to ensure a failure probability, due to 
reaching the span length to the critical length, not exceeding 10-4 and should be 
performed annually to ensure a failure probability not exceeding 10·5. 
In the optimization problem for selecting the optimum NDI technique, it is assumed that 
the free span will be surveyed at regular intervals in order to keep it not exceeding the 
critical length (50 meters), so the stres range distribution is not changed and can be 
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conservatively modeled by Weibull distribution at the critical length (50 meters) with 8 = 
13.4 Mpa and~= 1.5. The average number of stress cycles is 2.4xl06 cycle/year. 
The initial (pre-service) flaws size (depth), a0 , is modeled as a lognmmally distributed 
random variable with a mean value of 0.97 rnrn and a standard deviation of 0.504 rnrn 
[Tronsker et al. (2002)].The critical crack size (depth of the crack at which leakage will 
occur), acr is considered to be constant at 5 mm for this application. The fatigue crack 
growth parameter, C, is modeled as a lognormal variable with a mean value of 6.06xl0-13 
assuming Lmits of millimeters for crack size and MPa.mm 112 for fracture toughness and a 
standard deviation of 1.58x10-13 rnrn [Tronsker et al. (2002)]. The value of the material 
parameter, C, is higher in this application than its value in the previous application (ship 
structure welding joint) because of the environmental effect under sea water which 
accelerate the cracks propagation (corrosion fatigue) while in ship application, the 
considered welding joint is not in contact with the sea water (i.e only fatigue). The fatigue 
crack growth exponent, m, is modeled as a normally distributed random variable with a 
mean value of 3 and a standard deviation of 0.14 rnrn. The repair policy dedicates the 
repair for any detected crack size (i.e. ar = 0). The geometry function F(a) is taken also 
unity for simplicity in this application. 
Maximum acceptable probability of failure to detect a growing crack before reaching the 
critical size is taken as 0.001 for this application. 
Two NDI techniques are considered in this application, Ultrasonic inspection (UI) and 
Magnetic Inspection (MI) while Liquid Penetrant Inspection (PI) is not applicable under 
water. POD functions for UI and MI are assumed to be the same as presented in ship 
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tructure application. The relative costs of inspection (K1), cost of repair, KR, and cost of 
failure, KF, are taken as: 
Kt,MI: KI.Ut : KR : KF = 1.2 : 1.5 : 10 : 20000 
For the lack of data of PFC of the two NDI techniques when used for inspecting sub-sea 
pipelines while the noise in subsea environmental could be different from the noise in air, 
PFC for each inspection technique is also assumed to be the same as presented in ship 
structure application (PFCu1 = 1.4% and PFCMt = 5%). 
The applied stre s intensity factor, L\k, is conservatively assumed to be greater than the 
threshold stress intensity range, L\kth. in all the stress cycles. In this ca e, the sequence of 
the applied variable stress does not affect the accumulated crack growth and the crack 
growth can be obtained by effective stre s method. 
By applying the proposed model (Fig. 5.1), the obtained result are shown in Table 6.6, 
Table 6.7 and the following figures. 
Table 6.6: Results obtained for UI technique (K1,M1:K1,u1:KR:KF = 1.2:1.5:10:20000 $) 
Inspection interval (year) 
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
OF 525.63 268.96 188.30 157.87 155.35 168.31 197.58 248.23 301.77 377.84 
E[Pr] 0.0003 0.0005 0.0009 0.0015 0.0027 0.0042 0.0063 0.0093 0.01 24 0.0164 
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Table 6.7: Results obtained for MI technique (KJ,MJ:KJ,UJ:KR:KF = 1.2:1.5:10:20000 $) 
Inspection interval (year) 
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
OF 458.92 241.55 186.32 184.63 216.64 271.84 346.80 447.95 553.31 682.94 
E[Pr] 0.0003 0.0008 0.0019 0.0037 0.0064 0.0100 0.0142 0.0197 0.0253 0.0320 
Fig. 6.8 shows the cost of inspection and cost of repair (fal e repairs and justifiable 
repairs) versus different inspection intervals for the two inspection techniques. 
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Fig. 6.8: Cost versus different inspection intervals (subsea pipelines) 
Figs. 6.9 and 6.10 show the expected probability of failure, E[Pr], and cost of failure, 
E[Cr], to detect a growing crack before reaching the critical size versus different 
inspection intervals. 
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Fig. 6.11 shows the objective function versus different inspection intervals. 
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Fig. 6.11: Objective function versus different inspection intervals (subsea pipelines) 
Mean of the critical time to failure, tcr.mean. obtained from the simulation of the crack 
growth rate, is 42.5 year with standard deviation of 35.2 year. 
From Fig. 6.9, Table 6.6 and Table 6.7, the maximum acceptable inspection interval 
which keeps probability of failure, E[Pr], not exceeding 0.001 (safety constraint) is 1.5 
year for UI and 1 year for MI. From Fig. 6.11, the minimum value of the objective 
function is 155.35 (located at inspection interval 2.5 years) for UI and 184.6307 (located 
at inspection interval 2 years) for MI. By comparing the minimum value of the objective 
function of the two inspection techniques, it is preferable to use UI technique with 
inspection interval 1.5 year, but for the safety constraint, the inspection interval should 
not exceed 1.5 year for UI and 1 year for MI. By comparing the value of the objective 
function at inspection interval of 1.5 years for UI which is 188.30 and at 1 years for MI 
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which is 241.55, leads to the optimum selection between the two techniques (Uland Ml) 
is UI with inspection interval of 1.5 years where that selection shall ensure the minimum 
possible value of the objective function taking into consideration the afety constraint 
(E[Pr] < 0.001). 
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Chapter 7 
Discussion and Conclusions 
7.1 Discussion 
1- Cost of inspection and cost of repairs increase as the inspection interval decrea es 
(Figs. 6.2 and 6.8) because the shorter the inspection interval is the greater the 
expected number of inspections during the lifetime will be. This leads to high cost 
of inspection and high cost of repairs. 
2- The longer the inspection interval is the higher the probability of failure. This will 
cause a higher cost of failure (Figs. 6.3, 6.4, 6.9 and 6.10). This is caused by the 
fact that the longer the inspection interval is the smaller the expected number of 
inspections during the lifetime will be. 
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3- Probability of failure when u ing the ultrasonic (UI) technique is lower than when 
using the magnetic particle (MI) technique or the penetrant (PI) technique (Figs. 
6.3 and 6.9) because the POD for the ultrasonic technique is higher than the POD 
for both the magnetic particle technique and the penetrant technique. 
4- The inspection interval which is required to achieve the optimum cost in ca e of 
the ultrasonic technique is larger than in the case of the magnetic particle 
technique or the penetrant technique because the ultrasonic technique has better 
detectability (POD), (Figs 6.5 and 6.11). 
5- The objective function for all case considered is valley-shaped. 
6- After applying the safety constraint, a maximum acceptable inspection interval 
can be obtained at which the probability of failure equals the maximum acceptable 
probability of failure (Pr.accep1). The probability of failure is taken as 0.005 for the 
ship structure application and 0.001 for the subsea pipelines. The optimal 
inspection interval for an NDI technique can be found at the minimum value of 
the objective function curve taking into consideration the optimum inspection 
interval should be less than the maximum acceptable inspection interval for the 
safety constraint. If the maximum acceptable inspection interval is less than the 
inspection interval at the minimum value of the objective function, the optimum 
inspection interval should be the same as the maximum acceptable inspection 
interval. 
7- The cost of failure depends on the criticality of the inspected detail and the cost of 
each repair depends on the repair method, the location of that repair and shutdown 
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co t (if required). The change in the objective function a a result of the change in 
the failure cost is studied for different relative cost of failure, kF, keeping the co t 
of each repair, kR, (the repair policy is ar = 0) and the cost of inspection, k1, 
constant. The valley shaped curve of the objective function is shifted up and to the 
left when increa ing the relative cost of failure, kF, which make the optimum 
inspection interval shorter (Fig . 7.1 and 7.2). The change in the objective 
function as a result of the change in repair cost, kR, is studied for different relative 
cost of repair, kR, (the repair policy is ar = 0) keeping cost of failure, kF, and cost 
of each inspection, k1, constant. The valley shaped curve of the objective function 
is shifted up and to the right when increasing the relative cost of repair, kR, which 
makes the optimum inspection interval longer (Figs . 7.1 and 7 .2). The ultrasonic 
inspection technique, UI, i the optimal technique for the two cases studied in thi 
thesis, see Figs. 7.1 to 7.4. 
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Fig. 7.4: Objective function for different relative cost of repair, kR (subsea pipelines) 
126 
7.2 Conclusions 
A probabilistic optimization model for selecting an optimal NDI technique and an 
associated in pection interval has been presented. The objective function including 
inspections cost, repairs cost over the lifetime and cost of failure is formulated as a 
function of the reliability of the NDI technique (Probability of Detection function "POD" 
and the Probability of False Calls "PFC"), the condition of the inspected component 
(critical time to failure "tcr". the probability of the presence a crack in the inspected asset 
"H"), and the inspection interval ''tint". The decision variables (controllable) are POD, 
PFC and tint· The objective function is minimized subject to the safety constraint that the 
probability of failure to detect a growing crack before reaching the critical size, E[Pr.l. 
does not exceed a predefined level, Pr,accept· 
The probability of each inspection outcome is estimated using an event tree of the 
possible inspection outcomes. Cracks are growing with time so probability of presence of 
a crack, H, is calculated based on the distribution of the crack size at inspection time. The 
optimization problem is solved for different inspection techniques. The optimum 
nondestructive inspection technique and its associated inspection interval are obtained by 
comparing the values of the objective functions for the inspection techniques taking into 
consideration the safety constraint. 
The model was applied to two case studies: a part of the structure of a ship and a egment 
of a subsea pipeline. In both cases, it was found that the ultrasonic technique is optimal. 
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Appendix 
Matlab Program for the Proposed Optimization Model 
clear all 
% No. of simulations = s 
% inspection interval = tint (years) 
% cost of one inspections = ki 
% cost of failure = kf 
% critical time to failure = tcr 
% critical crack size = acr (mm) 
% probability of detection of the inspection technique for one of the 
candidates inspection techniques = POD 
% probability of false calls of the inspection technique for one of the 
candidates inspection techniques= PFC 
% alpha of the POD function = v 
% beta of the POD function = p 
% initial crack s ize (preexisting cracks) = ao 
% coeff. of variation and mean of preexis t ing cracks = covao and muao 
% parameters of weibull distribution for the var iable s tress = b1 a n d b 2 
% probability of having a crack = Gamma 
% time = t 
% frequency of loading = f 
s =input ( 1 S = 1 ) 
%acr = 5 for pipeline application; 
acr = input ( 1 acr = 1 ) 
%v = -0.119 for UI; 
v = input ( I v = 1 ) 
%p = 2.986 for UI; 
p = input ( 1 p = 1 ) 
%PFC = 0.014 for UI; 
PFC = input ( I PFC 1 ) 
%Ki = 1.5 for UI; 
Ki = input ( 1 Ki = 1 ) 
%Kr = 10 for pipeline application ; 
Kr = input ( ' Kr I ) 
%Kf = 20000; 
Kf = input ( 1 Kf 1 ) 
%covao = 0.52 for pipeline application; 
covao = input (' covao = 1 ) 
%muao = 0.97 for pipeline application; 
muao = input (I muao = I) 
%b1 = 13.4 for p i peline application; 
b1 = input ( 1 b1 = 1 ) 
%b2 = 1.5 for pipeline application; 
b2 = input ( 1 b2 = 1 ) 
%f = 2400000 for pipeline applicati on; 
f = input ( 1 f = 1 ) 
% lognormal distribution parameter estimation 
sigmasqyao = log(1+covaoA2); 
sigmayao = sigmasqyaoA0.5; 
muyao=log(muao) - 0 . 5*sigmasqyao; 
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cove= input (' cove= ') 
muc = input (' muc = ') 
% cove = 0.26 for pipeline application; 
% muc =6.06e-13 for pipeline application; 
sigmasqyc = log(1+covcA2); 
sigmayc = sigmasqyc A0.5; 
muyc=log(muc)-0 . 5*sigmasqyc ; 
for t = 1:300 
T (t) = t; 
k1 =1; 
for x =1:ceil(s / 5) 
disp(x) 
disp ( t) 
%m = random ('normal' , 3 , 0.14); 
m = normrnd(3 , 0.14); 
%c = random('lognormal' ,muyc, sigmayc); 
c = lognrnd(muyc, sigmayc); 
ao = lognrnd(muyao,sigmayao); 
SRE = b1*gamma((1 + m/ b2)) A(1/m); 
if m ==2 
tcr=log(acr / ao) / (3.14*c*SREA2*f); 
else 
tcr = ((acr) A((2-m) / 2)-aoA((2 - m) / 2}) / (((2-
m) / 2)*3.14 A(m/ 2)*c*SREAm*f); 
end 
if t<tcr 
if m 2 
a = ao*exp(3.14*c*SREA2*f*t); 
else 
a = (aoA( (2-m) / 2)+((2-m) / 2)*3.14A(m/ 2)*c*SREAm* f *t) A(2 / (2-m)); 
end 
end 
k=O; 
A(k1) = a; 
k1 =k1+1; 
end 
end 
Mean(t) = mean(A); 
StD(t) = std(A); 
for tint = 0 . 5:0.5:5 
k =k+1; 
disp('inspection interval'), disp(tint) 
Tint (k) = tint; 
sumn = 0; 
sumtr = 0; 
sumtcr=O; 
SumPr1 0; 
SumPr2 0; 
AvgPfs 0; 
s1=0; 
for j = 1:s 
disp (j) 
disp (tint) 
%m = random ('normal' , 3 , 0.14); 
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m = normrnd(3 , 0.14); 
%c = random('lognormal' ,muyc, sigmayc); 
%ao = random('lognormal' ,muyao,sigmayao); 
c = lognrnd(muyc, sigmayc); 
ao = lognrnd(muyao,sigmayao); 
SRE = b1*gamma((1 + m/b2))~(1/m); 
if m ==2 
tcr=log(acr/ao)/(3.14*c*SRE~2*f) 
else 
tcr = ( (acr)~((2-m)/2)-ao~ ((2-m)/2}) / (((2-
m)/2)*3.14~(m/2)*c*SRE~m*f); 
end 
Tcr(j) = tcr; 
z = tcr/tint; 
n = floor(z); 
if tint>tcr 
end 
Pnd = 1; 
P3 = 1; 
Pfs = 1; 
if tint<tcr 
s1=s1+1; 
Pnd = 1; 
P3 = 1; 
Pfs 1 ; 
for i = 1 : n 
t = i*tint; 
if m == 2 
a 
else 
ao*exp(3 . 14*c*SRE~2*f*t) 
a (ao~ ((2 -m) / 2)+((2-
m) / 2)*3.14 ~ (m/2)*c*SRE~m*f*t) ~ (2 / (2-m)); 
end 
if t <300 
Sigmaaonew = StD(ceil(t)); 
Muaonew = Mean(ceil(t)); 
else 
Sigmaaonew = StD(300); 
Muaonew = Mean(300); 
end 
Covaonew=Sigmaaonew/ Muaonew; 
Sigmasqyaonew = log(l+Covaonew~2); 
Sigmayaonew = Sigmasqyaonew~0.5; 
Muyaonew=log(Muaonew)-0.5*Sigmasqyaonew; 
%Gamma= cdf('lognormal' ,a,Muyaonew,Sigmayaonew); 
Gamma = logncdf(a,Muyaonew,Sigmayaonew); 
POD = (exp(v+p*log(a) )) / (1+( exp(v+p*log(a) ))); 
Pndnew = 1-POD; 
Pfsnew = (1-POD)*Gamma; 
Pr1 = PFC*(1-Gamma); 
Pr2 = POD*Gamma; 
SumPr1 = SumPrl + Pr1; 
SumPr2 = SumPr2 + Pr2; 
Pfs = Pfs*Pfsnew; 
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end 
end 
end 
AvgPfs AvgPfs + Pfs; 
sumn = sumn + n; 
sumter = sumter + tcr; 
AvgPfsl = AvgPfs / s; 
Pfnews(k)=AvgPfsl; 
navg = floor(sumn/s); 
savenavg(k) = navg; 
SumPrl = SumPrl/s; 
SumPr2 = SumPr2 / s; 
ci = navg*Ki; 
Ci (k) = ci; 
cfnews = AvgPfsl*Kf; 
Cfnews(k) = cfnews; 
crls = SumPrl*Kr; 
cr2s = SumPr2*Kr; 
Crls(k) = crls; 
Cr2s(k) = cr2s; 
costnews = ci + cfnews ; 
COSTnews(k) = costnews; 
avgtcr = sumtcr/s; 
end 
disp('Results for this inspection technique') 
disp('Inspection Cost') 
disp (Ci) 
disp('False repairs Cost') 
disp(Crls) 
disp('Justifiable repairs Cost ') 
disp(Cr2s) 
disp( 'Risk') 
disp (Cfnews) 
disp('Probability of Failure ') 
disp(Pfnews) 
disp(COSTnews) 
disp(Objective Function "OF"') 
disp(Ci+Cfnews+Crls+Cr2s) 
OFmin=min(COSTnews+Crls+Cr2s); 
disp ('Minimum val ue of t h e Obj ective function "OFmi n" ') 
disp(OFmin) 
disp('Expected lifetime "tcr,mean" = ') 
disp (mean (Tcr )) 
dfi t tool(Tcr) 
subplot 231; 
xlabel ('Inspection Interval in years "t_ i _ n_ t" ' ) 
ylabel('Objective Function "OF"') 
hold on 
plot(Tint,COSTnews+Crls+Cr2s, ' - o') 
grid 
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hold off 
s ubplot 232 ; 
p l ot (Tint 1 Ci 1 ' :s' ) 
h o ld on 
plot ( Tint ~ Crls l ' -x' ) 
plot(Tint 1 Cr2s 1 ' -* ') 
x label ( ' Inspection interval in years "t_i_n_t"') 
ylabel ( 'Cost' ) 
legend( ' Inspection Cost ' 1 'False Repairs Cost' 1 'Justifiable Repairs 
Cost') 
grid 
hold off 
subplot 233; 
plot (Tint 1 Cfnewsl ' -v ') 
xlabel ( ' Inspection interval in years "t_ i_n_t"') 
ylabel ( ' Risk' ) 
grid 
hold off 
subplot 234; 
plot(Tint 1 Pfnews l ' -v ') 
xla bel ( ' Inspection interval in years " t_i_n_t " ' ) 
y l abel( ' Probability of Failure "E [P_f )" ' ) 
grid 
hold off 
subplot 235; 
plot(T 1 Mean) 
xlabel( ' time "years "') 
ylabel ( ' Mean ' ) 
title (' Mean of cracks size at a given time ' ) 
grid 
hold off 
subplot 236 ; 
plot(T~StD) 
xlabel('time "years " ') 
ylabel('Standard Deviation') 
title ( 'Standard deviation of cracks size at a given time') 
grid 
d isp(' Run the program for the other inspection techniques and compare 
the value of the optimization function and probability of failure to 
obtain the optimum nondestructive inspection technique (NDI) and its 
assoc i ated inspection interval ') 
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